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ABSTRACT 
We conduct a detailed doctrinal and empirical study of the adverse 
effects of parole on the constitutional rights of both individual parolees and 
the communities in which they live. We show that parolees’ Fourth, Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment rights have been eroded by a multitude of punitive 
conditions endorsed by the courts. Punitive parole conditions actually 
increase parolees’ vulnerability to criminal elements, and thus likely 
worsen recidivism. Simultaneously, the parole system broadly undermines 
the rights of nonparolees, including family members, cotenants, and 
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communities. We show that police target parolee-dense neighborhoods for 
additional Terry stops, even when income, race, population, and single-
family status are accounted for. Furthermore, police take advantage of the 
permissive parole search jurisprudence, conducting more searches and 
arrests of both parolees and their nonparolee neighbors. Combined, this 
analysis shows that parole institutionalizes individuals and marginalizes 
communities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prisoner parole1 is widely considered to be a defendant-friendly 
institution2 for obvious reasons—it is designed to reduce the sentences that 
individuals serve in prison and to aid prisoner reintegration.3 However, a 
detailed analysis of how parole actually operates raises serious doubts 
about whether it really works in the interests of the incarcerated. In this 
Article, we show that there are a number of institutional mechanisms by 
which parole significantly undermines the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
 
 1. Unless otherwise noted, this Article uses the terms “parole” and “community supervision” to 
refer to post-release community supervision after incarceration. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, Parole and 
Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 479, 482 (1999) (noting that jurisdictions use 
different terms to refer to this period of supervision).  
 2. See Position Statement, AM. PROBATION & PAROLE ASS’N (Jan. 1987), http://www.appa-
net.org/eweb/Dynamicpage.aspx?webcode=IB_PositionStatement (describing the parole system as one 
designed to assist parolees); AMY L. SOLOMON ET AL., URBAN INST., DOES PAROLE WORK? (2005), 
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311156_ Does_Parole_Work.pdf (providing a more 
nuanced view of parole). 
 3. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (noting that parole was meant “to help 
individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being 
confined for the full term of the sentence imposed” and that it “also serve[d] to alleviate the costs to 
society of keeping an individual in prison”). See also Joel M. Caplan, Parole System Anomie: 
Conflicting Models of Casework and Surveillance, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 2006, at 32, 32–33 (2006) 
(describing the history of and policies supporting parole).  
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Amendment rights of parolees, as well as the Fourth Amendment rights of 
their communities. We conduct a detailed doctrinal and empirical analysis 
showing that the extensive conditions imposed on parolees, combined with 
other permissive search and seizure jurisprudence and police targeting of 
parolee-dense neighborhoods for nonrandomized stops, have resulted in 
significant yet unappreciated attrition of constitutional rights. 
For parolees, the standard for reincarceration on suspicion of a parole 
violation is very low. Like other arrests, the federal standard for arrest for a 
parole violation is probable cause;4 but unlike other arrestees, parolees can 
be held for up to three months awaiting a violation hearing. In addition, the 
standard at that hearing is not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but rather a 
preponderance of the evidence.5 These low bars for extended incarceration 
of parolees awaiting a hearing create numerous points of vulnerability in 
constitutional rights.  
First, the possibility of being incarcerated for three months for minor 
or technical violations of parole provides a powerful means of leverage 
over parolees. Police use this leverage to recruit parolees as confidential 
informants, a role that places parolees in danger but nonetheless serves an 
important community policing function. However, it also makes the parolee 
subject to less altruistic forms of influence. Local criminals and gangs who 
know the parole status of individuals can use the threat of reporting a 
violation of the terms of release—real or trumped up—as a basis for 
coercion. As such, although parole is meant to keep parolees on the path 
toward reintegration into the community, it actually provides a means of 
blackmailing parolees into criminality and recidivism.  
Second, whatever the basis for arrest for an alleged parole violation, 
the rehabilitation and reintegration goals that the parole system was 
intended to promote are undermined by the length of incarceration that 
parolees face while awaiting their violation hearings. Even if exonerated, 
three months of incarceration is likely to cause parolees to lose their jobs, 
their welfare benefits, their access to schooling and housing, and even 
potentially their stabilizing relationships—the very elements that are the 
 
 4. A supervised parolee “may be arrested” “[i]f there is probable cause to believe” he or she 
“has violated a condition of his . . . release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3606 (2012). 
 5. Id. § 3583(e)(3) (providing that a court may modify or revoke supervised release if it “finds 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release”). See 
also United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting § 3583(e)(3) for the 
conclusion that a district court must find a violation of supervised release by a “preponderance of the 
evidence”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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best predictors of successful reintegration.6 Recidivism is often considered 
a consequence of the individual’s propensity to commit more crimes. But 
by creating a perverse system whereby minor infractions of parole lead to 
potentially disproportionate punishments, the regulatory system and 
jurisprudence of parole ultimately extend individuals’ institutionalization 
and undermine their rehabilitation.  
Third, the Sixth Amendment rules pertaining to parole are extremely 
restrictive of parolees’ rights. As mentioned, conviction for a release 
violation requires only a preponderance of the evidence. So if a parolee is 
accused of a crime while on parole, he or she can be acquitted of that crime 
yet nonetheless be reincarcerated for that very offense under the lower 
standard of a parole violation. Furthermore, even if the parolee is only 
accused of a technical violation—for instance, failing to attend meetings 
with a parole supervisor—he or she can be subject to a longer term of 
incarceration than he was initially sentenced to serve. Not only that, but the 
parole violation can extend his or her sentence beyond the maximum 
sentence allowed for the initial crime.7 These Sixth Amendment issues 
have been considered by the courts, and although we show logical 
inconsistencies in that jurisprudence, the point is not to reargue their 
merits; rather, when considered in combination with the other ramifications 
of parole described here, it becomes apparent that the overall effect of 
parole on prisoners can be to elongate rather than shorten sentences and 
also to further contribute to the institutionalized cycle of imprisonment.  
An institutionalized culture of incarceration has been well documented 
as extending beyond the individual to particular subgroups of the 
community, particularly racial minorities.8 What has not been appreciated, 
however, is the role that parole plays in that process of institutionalizing the 
culture of incarceration. This effect is not simply indirect, trickling down 
from the individual to the community by virtue of the sheer number of 
individuals incarcerated in particular regions or cultures; rather, the rights 
of individuals who live with or near parolees are directly undermined by 
the parole system and its jurisprudence. 
Most significantly, if you live with a parolee or if the police suspect 
that you live with a parolee, your constitutional rights can be directly and 
 
 6. See infra notes 234–35. 
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
 8. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in 
African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004) (analyzing the destructive impact of 
incarceration at the community level rather than the individual level). 
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adversely affected by rulings that parolees can be subjected to manifold 
stringent restrictions.9 In Samson v. California, the Supreme Court 
permitted parole conditions so strict that they “diminish or eliminate” any 
reasonable expectation of privacy.10 Thus, Samson allows police to conduct 
searches of parolees and their homes without a warrant or even reasonable 
suspicion.11 Not only are individual parolees subject to arbitrary searches 
and essentially forced to waive their own Fourth Amendment rights,12 but 
to a large extent parole also has similar effects for those with whom they 
live.13 The ramifications of this situation are far more profound for 
particular communities—consider that “[o]ne in three young African 
American men will serve time in prison if the current trends continue, and 
in some cities more than half of all young adult black men are currently 
under correctional control—in prison or jail, on probation or parole.”14 
Conceivably, then, there are entire neighborhoods in which Fourth 
Amendment rights have little meaning. The community effect, then, is not 
simply an aggregate of the effect on individuals, but rather it further 
exacerbates the impact of parole on rights attrition. 
Parole jurisprudence raises the risk of serious attrition of community 
rights. To determine whether this possibility is in fact a reality, we conduct 
an empirical assessment of the extent to which different communities are 
facing diminution of their Fourth Amendment rights. We created two new 
databases that combine New York City parolee residence data with Terry 
stop15 data as well as frisk, search, and arrest data. We establish two 
 
 9. Moore v. Vega, 371 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2004); Thornton v. Lund, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 
1057 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (citing Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2005)) (“[I]f officials 
reasonably believe that a parolee or probationer lives at a particular house, courts analyze the search as 
if the parolee or probationer in fact lived there.”). 
 10. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006). 
 11. Id. See also Thornton, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 
112, 121 (2001); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875–76 (1987)) (“The Fourth Amendment 
provides lesser protection to parolees and probationers; such individuals may not complain of a 
warrantless search of their residence.”). 
 12. United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the defendant’s 
decision to make a blanket waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights was valid, since “imprisonment is a 
greater invasion of personal privacy than being exposed to searches of one’s home on demand”). 
 13. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 14. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 9 (2010). Alexander’s data is based on THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001 (2003), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf. 
 15. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), created an exception to the ordinary rule that individuals 
cannot be seized without probable cause and a warrant. Under Terry stops, police need only reasonable 
articulable suspicion to temporarily seize a person; furthermore, police can frisk—pat down the outside 
of the clothes of—an individual if they have reasonable suspicion that the subject possesses a weapon. 
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important effects showing that police target parolee-dense communities for 
nonrandomized stops and further intrusions. 
First, we demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between rates 
of parolee residence and police Terry stops in New York City. Obviously 
this does not prove causation: we expect there to be more Terry stops in 
high-crime neighborhoods, and also more parolee residents in high-crime 
neighborhoods. However, our regression analysis shows that this finding is 
robust even after controlling for factors such as race, income, and density 
of single-parent families. These ordinary predictors of crime do not fully 
explain police targeting of individuals for Terry stops: the density of 
parolees in a neighborhood is significant beyond mere crime targeting by 
police. 
The effect in fact overwhelms the race of the neighborhood—when 
parolee status is factored in, race no longer predicts the occurrence of Terry 
stops in New York City. This has great significance for the highly salient 
litigation that the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) recently 
settled, with an agreement for ongoing judicial oversight.16 The high 
correlation also shows the potential impact of the jurisprudential rules 
described above: entire neighborhoods with little to no constitutional 
criminal rights. Our results suggest that parole is likely to exacerbate the 
already troubled relationship that exists between the police and targeted 
minorities. 
Second, we show that not only do police stop more individuals in high 
parolee density neighborhoods, but that they then conduct significantly 
more searches and arrests in those neighborhoods. The rate of frisks, 
however, are lower in parolee-dense neighborhoods, suggesting that police 
are not simply targeting high-crime or high-convict neighborhoods: only 
searches of parolees require lower suspicion thresholds, enabling police to 
skip frisks and go straight to searches without probable cause. The numbers 
 
Any evidence gathered can then be used to establish probable cause for a search or arrest.  
 16. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), is a federal class action 
lawsuit filed against the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) and the City of New York that 
found that the NYPD practice of nonrandom stop and frisks constituted unconstitutional racial 
discrimination. On November 11, 2013, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals granted the 
city’s motion to stay the district court’s remedial decision. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F. 3d 118 
(2d Cir. 2013). However, on November 24, 2013, the Court of Appeals issued an order holding this, and 
all other pending motions, in abeyance. Id. Floyd is one of three simultaneous lawsuits challenging the 
constitutionality of the NYPD stop and frisk program. The others are Ligon v. City of New York, 925 
F.Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (challenging stops, ticket issuance and arrests of individuals in private 
apartment buildings) and Raza v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-3448, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166820 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2013) (alleging religious profiling in NYPD stops of Muslim New Yorkers). 
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are so significant that it is unlikely that only parolees are being targeted. 
Entire communities where parolees commonly reside are subject to 
different policing strategies. These results indicate that police have been 
utilizing the permissive search jurisprudence we critique to nonrandomly 
target some neighborhoods for greater intrusions. Samson and its ilk are 
having meaningful adverse effects on the broader communities in which 
parolees reside. 
The first step to solving these problems is to recognize their existence 
and to question whether parole is really a positive mechanism of 
reintegrating convicts back into the community. Finding a solution also 
requires re-examining the jurisprudence surrounding parole, given these 
largely unintended consequences, and in light of our empirical findings of 
nonrandomized policing practices extending beyond race—parole is 
another geographic mechanism for the infectious degradation of 
community rights.  
Throughout this Article, we analyze both the federal parole system, 
called supervised release, and the parole system in New York State as 
illustrations. New York rules on Terry stops are actually less intrusive than 
the Supreme Court allows.17 Nevertheless, we show that in application, 
New York parolees and their communities are still vulnerable targets for 
police profiling. This is because even when jurisdictions only utilize some 
of the permissive Terry stop rules, in combination with other lowered rights 
created by the parole jurisprudence, parolees effectively have no real 
protection against police targeting. In effect, some lowered rights breed 
further lowered rights, for both the individual and the community. We first 
show this in terms of broad doctrinal theory, then in application. 
Part I provides a brief background of parole, including the rules of 
operation and rates of revocation. It then describes the terms in which we 
assess the merits of the current parole system as crime enforcement and 
convict reintegration policy.  
Part II provides an in-depth doctrinal analysis, exploring the adverse 
impact on parolees’ constitutional rights. It first shows how Samson 
combines with Georgia v. Randolph18 to diminish the constitutional rights 
of both parolees and the nonparolee communities in which parolees live. 
Not only is the individual institutionalized by the parole system, but also 
the constitutional rights of communities are systematically diminished. It 
 
 17. See infra note 254 (showing that the rules in New York are somewhat more generous but 
otherwise similar to numerous other states). 
 18. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
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then establishes how parole can actually extend rather than shorten 
parolees’ sentences, even beyond the legislative maximums, and analyzes 
the Sixth Amendment implications of this policy. This part then describes 
the attrition of other procedural rights by the parole system, including 
(1) the state’s lowered burden in parole revocation hearings, (2) evidentiary 
issues, and (3) other Fourth and Fifth Amendment ramifications. 
Part III considers the practical effects of the parole system. It 
illustrates that the jurisprudence that permits extremely stringent parole 
conditions results in the vulnerability of individual parolees, decreasing 
their rights as against the police and increasing their manipulability by 
criminal elements. It then describes in detail the lowered burden on the 
police for stops and searches of parolees in New York City. 
Part IV tests whether police target parolees in Terry stops, frisks, 
searches and arrests in New York City, and whether that affects not only 
parolees but also the community more broadly. We show that individual 
and community rights are being adversely affected in systematic ways by a 
parole jurisprudence of restrictive conditions and aggressive police 
searches, resulting in increased police stops, searches and arrests.  
Part IV tests only one aspect of the attrition of individual and 
community rights enabled by an overly punitive parole system. Parts I-III 
provide the doctrinal framework to show why police will have incentives to 
target parolees in Terry stops and explore the broader impact of the parole 
system on the attrition of individual and community rights. Together, the 
legal and empirical analyses show that the overall parole framework 
undermines the reintegrative aims of the parole system. 
I.  BACKGROUND: PAROLE AND SUPERVISED RELEASE  
In this part, we briefly provide the most important background 
information on the parole system, including: an introduction to the central 
rules and operation of the parole system in federal and state jurisdictions; 
conditions of parole and bases of revocation; and rates of revocation and 
recidivism. We then describe how we assess the parole system, and how we 
can conclude that parole is diminishing constitutional rights overall. 
A.  PAROLE IN GENERAL 
In the federal system, community supervision—referred to as 
supervised release—is imposed by the court at sentencing and is mandatory 
when the individual is sentenced to a period of incarceration of one year or 
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more.19 In addition, a court may also use its discretion to order supervised 
release whenever it imprisons an offender.20 In these discretionary cases, 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines give courts detailed guidance about 
whether to impose a term of supervised release and what conditions to 
include. The court must consider certain statutory factors, including “the 
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 
of the defendant,” the need to deter crime, and the need to provide 
restitution.21 It should focus particular attention on the seriousness of the 
offender’s criminal history.22 A court should consider the same factors in 
determining whether to impose supervised release and the length of that 
release.23 Section 3583(b) of Title 18 of the United States Code describes 
the maximum periods of supervised release for different levels of offense.24 
Importantly, the term of supervised release is in addition to a term of 
imprisonment and “does not replace” any “portion of” this term.25 This fact 
belies the common first response to criticism of the parole system from the 
perspective of the individual convict: that although parole conditions may 
be extremely stringent, presumably parole is preferable to remaining in 
prison, since parole amounts to at least partial freedom for a length of time 
that would otherwise be spent in incarceration. We return to this topic in 
Part II.B. 
Throughout this Article, to illustrate the operation of parole in the 
 
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (2012) (providing that a court “may include as a part of the sentence a 
requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment”); U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1(a)(2) (2013) (requiring supervised release when “a 
sentence of imprisonment of more than one year is imposed”). A term of community supervision is also 
mandatory if the statute governing the crime requires it or if the offender is convicted of domestic 
violence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). And if the offender “is an abuser” of drugs or alcohol, “it is highly 
recommended” that the court include a term of supervised release. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5D1.1 cmt. n.3(C). 
 20. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1(b). 
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). These are a “subset” of the factors a court must consider in determining 
how to punish someone convicted of a crime. See also id. § 3553(a) (“Factors to Be Considered in 
Imposing a Sentence”); United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 203 (6th Cir. 2011) (discussing the use 
of these factors).  
 22. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1 cmt. n.3(B). 
 23. Id. § 5D1.2 cmt. n.4 (“The court should ensure that the term imposed on the defendant is 
long enough to address the purposes of imposing supervised release on the defendant.”). 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (providing, for example, maximum periods of release of five years for 
Class A or B felonies and three years for Class C or D felonies). The Sentencing Guidelines require 
minimal terms of release for these levels of offense. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5D1.2(a). 
 25. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A2(b) (“Unlike parole, a term of supervised 
release does not replace a portion of the sentence of imprisonment, but rather is an order of supervision 
in addition to any term of imprisonment imposed by the court.”).  
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states, we examine New York code and practices. New York law, like 
federal law, provides for the release of offenders to parole.26 The length of 
parole supervision depends upon the class of the felony and the offender’s 
criminal history,27 and is negotiable as long as it falls within the guideline 
range.28 Depending on the crime of conviction, even community 
supervision for the remainder of an offender’s life is acceptable.29 Since the 
period of supervision is considered part of the sentence, defendants must be 
informed of it as part of the sentencing judgment,30 and knowledge of 
supervision is required for a guilty plea to be considered knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent.31  
B.  CONDITIONS OF COMMUNITY SUPERVISION 
The conditions of community supervision are fairly standard across 
jurisdictions. They typically include reporting requirements, curfews, 
prohibitions on the use of drugs or alcohol, and restrictions on travel, 
residency, and associating with certain individuals or groups. In the federal 
system, courts must impose as a condition of release that the offender shall 
not commit another crime or possess illegal drugs, and the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines recommend more than a dozen “standard” conditions.32 For 
example, “the defendant shall not leave the judicial district . . . without the 
permission of the court or probation officer” and “the defendant shall 
support the defendant’s dependents.”33 Another standard requirement that 
we will explore the ramifications of in Part II.A specifies that “the 
defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit the defendant at any time 
at home or elsewhere.”34 This provision offers just one of the ways in 
 
 26. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.40 (McKinney 2009). Post-release supervision is mandatory for a 
number of felony offenses, including violent felonies, drug offenses, and sex offenses. Id. § 70.45. 
 27. Id. § 70.45; Spiros A. Tsimbinos & John M. Castellano, Practice Insights: Negotiating 
Period of Post-Release Supervision as Part of Determinate Term, in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45 (Consol. 
Supp. Feb. 2014). 
 28. Tsimbinos & Castellano, supra note 27 (“Counsel may negotiate the period of supervision 
within the permissible ranges as part of any plea and sentence discussion.”). 
 29. People v. Zammett, 849 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (App. Div. 2008) (holding that imposing 
community supervision for the remainder of an offender’s life for a criminal possession of a controlled 
substance in the third degree conviction was not too severe).  
 30. People v. Catu, 825 N.E.2d 1081, 1082 (N.Y. 2005) (holding that failure to inform defendant 
of community supervision must result in withdrawal of plea without a harmless error analysis). See also 
People v. Sparber, 889 N.E.2d 459, 464 (N.Y. 2008) (holding that a court’s failure to announce the 
required period of supervision at the time of sentencing makes the sentence unenforceable). 
 31. Catu, 825 N.E.2d at 1082. 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(a), (c) (2013).  
 33. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.3(a). 
 34. Id. § 5D1.3(c)(10) (emphasis added). 
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which the Fourth Amendment is restricted—sometimes radically so—for 
parolees.  
In deciding what conditions to impose, federal courts should consider, 
among other things, whether the conditions are “reasonably related to” the 
offense and the need to deter crime.35 According to federal statute, 
conditions should “involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is 
reasonably necessary.”36 However, as we shall see in Part II.A, Supreme 
Court jurisprudence tolerates considerably more intrusive conditions than 
the federal law provides. 
Unlike the federal system, in New York the Board of Parole sets the 
conditions of release.37 In addition to the typical conditions requiring 
parolees to report and to refrain from committing crimes, the general 
conditions of release also include a number of other provisions such as “I 
will reply promptly, fully, and truthfully to any inquiry of, or 
communication by, my Parole Officer,” and “I will permit my Parole 
Officer to visit me at my residence and/or place of employment and I will 
permit the search and inspection of my person, residence, and property.”38 
Special conditions meant to enhance community safety while also 
supporting the parolee’s reentry efforts may also be imposed.39 As we show 
in Part III, these conditions can be so onerous that they can sometimes 
encumber a parolee’s ability to find and maintain employment.40 
Furthermore, New York parolees must promise to “not be in the 
company of, or fraternize with any person I know to have a criminal record 
or whom I know to have been adjudicated a Youthful Offender, except for 
accidental encounters in public places, work, school, or in any other 
instance with the permission of my Parole Officer.”41 As we show in Part 
IV, there is a high variance between the saturation of parolees in different 
 
 35. Id. § 5B1.3(b). 
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(b) (using 
same language). 
 37. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45(3) (McKinney 2009).  
 38. New York State Parole Handbook: Questions and Answers Concerning Parole Release and 
Supervision, N.Y. STATE DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS & COMMUNITY SUPERVISION § 3(6) (Sept. 2007) 
[hereinafter Parole Handbook], https://www.parole.ny.gov/pdf/handbook6-09.pdf. 
 39. Peggy B. Burke, Collaboration for Successful Prisoner Reentry: The Role of Parole and the 
Courts, CORR. MGMT. Q., Summer 2001, at 11, 14 (“Although some conditions are clearly aimed at 
supporting the [individual] in transition, the total effect may be to create another layer of challenge to 
what is an already daunting situation.”).  
 40. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, The Failure of Parole: Rethinking the Role of the State in 
Reentry, 41 N.M. L. REV. 421, 448 (2011) (recounting a parolee’s difficulties in attempting to find 
employment while complying with reporting requirements). 
 41. Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 3(6). 
  
2014] THE ATTRITION OF RIGHTS UNDER PAROLE 899 
zip codes of New York; for high-density parolee zip codes, a condition of 
parole that prevents interactions with other parolees, let alone other 
convicts in general, is quite difficult to comply with in practice. 
C.  REVOCATION OF PAROLE 
Any violation of a release condition subjects the parolee to arrest42 
and revocation of community supervision.43 In the federal system, a parole 
officer can arrest a parolee without a warrant if the officer has probable 
cause to believe that the individual has violated a condition of supervised 
release.44 A court may also extend its jurisdiction over a parolee by issuing 
a warrant or summons during the period of supervision.45 Sanctions for 
violation of any release conditions range from a warning to full revocation 
and re-imprisonment, regardless of whether the violation is based on the 
commission of a new criminal offense or is merely a noncriminal technical 
violation, such as failing to report or comply with a curfew.46  
In determining the appropriate disposition, the court must consider the 
same statutory factors it considered when imposing the initial sentence.47 
Whether or not supervised release will be revoked depends upon the level 
of the infraction.48 The two highest of three possible violation levels 
require the court to revoke release49 while the third level does not require 
revocation.50 If the court revokes release, the Guidelines suggest ranges for 
the length of imprisonment.51  
Since the court’s punishment for a violation of supervised release is 
guided by the notion that the offender has committed a “breach” of the 
court’s “trust,” the sentence only addresses the violation.52 If the violation 
 
 42. 18 U.S.C. § 3606 (2012) (providing that a person on supervised release or parole “may be 
arrested” “[i]f there is probable cause to believe” he or she “has violated a condition of his . . . release”); 
Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 4. See also JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: 
PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 87 (2003) (discussing the consequences of a parole violation). 
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (“The court may [after considering certain factors] revoke a term of 
supervised release, and require the defendant to serve [time] in prison . . . .”). 
 44. Id. § 3606. The arrest of a releasee for violating a term of his release is legal only if 
supported by probable cause. United States v. Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d 951, 952–53 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(citing § 3606). 
 45. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i). 
 46. Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1039–42 (2013). 
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). 
 48. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 7B1.1(a), 7B1.3 (2013). 
 49. Id. § 7B1.3(a)(1). 
 50. Id. § 7B1.3(a)(2). 
 51. Id. § 7B1.4(a). 
 52. Id. ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b), introductory cmt. 
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is based upon new criminal conduct, punishment for that new conviction 
rests in the hands of the court adjudicating that new charge. Furthermore, in 
imposing a sentence for the violation, the court should consider, “to a 
limited degree,” the “seriousness” of the violation and the offender’s 
criminal history.53 The framework implies that “the sanction for the 
violation of trust should be in addition, or consecutive, to any sentence 
imposed for the new conduct.”54 In order to avoid double jeopardy and 
other constitutional problems, courts tie the post-revocation sanction to the 
original crime, rather than to the violation.55 We explore the Sixth 
Amendment implications of these rules in Part II.B. 
Should the parole officer opt for revocation, the parolee is entitled to 
written notice of the violation and a hearing before a “neutral and 
detached” body,56 and parolees can call witnesses and testify on their own 
behalf.57 However, as we explore in detail in Part II.C, there are many other 
aspects of the revocation process that permit considerably lowered Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights. In particular, parolees can be arrested 
with or without a warrant;58 there is no right to appointed counsel at the 
revocation hearing unless “fundamental fairness” requires it;59 the 
government need only prove a violation by a preponderance of the 
evidence;60 hearsay is generally admissible; and, at least in federal courts, 
the exclusionary rule does not apply.61  
Just as in the federal system, New York parole hearings are 
administrative proceedings, and thus parolees can be sent to prison without 
all of the protections normally attendant at criminal trials. When a parole 
officer presents evidence that there is probable cause to believe that the 
parolee has violated release conditions “in an important respect,” the parole 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (“We therefore attribute postrevocation 
penalties to the original conviction.”). 
 56. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1972). 
 57. Id. at 487; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973). 
 58. 18 U.S.C. § 3606 (2012) (providing that a person on supervised release or parole “may be 
arrested” “[i]f there is probable cause to believe” he or she “has violated a condition of his . . . release”).  
 59. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790. See also infra Part II.C. 
 60. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (providing that a court may modify or revoke supervised release if it 
“finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised 
release”). See also United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2008) (same); Parole 
Handbook, supra note 38, § 4(10) (explaining that the same burden of proof applies for parole 
revocation hearings in New York); infra Part II.C.1. 
 61. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998). See infra Part II.C.1 and 3. 
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board or a designated officer can issue a parole violation warrant.62 Upon 
arrest, bail is unavailable throughout the pendency of the revocation 
process.63 After execution of the warrant, the parolee must be given written 
notice of, among other things, the conditions allegedly violated.64  
A preliminary hearing must be scheduled within fifteen days of the 
arrest unless the parolee waives that entitlement.65 There is no right to 
counsel at this hearing, although one may be provided for those who cannot 
afford one.66 In this proceeding, a hearing officer determines whether there 
is probable cause to believe that the parolee violated a condition of 
release.67 If probable cause is found, the hearing officer can either schedule 
a final revocation hearing or restore the parolee to supervision.68  
A final revocation hearing must be held within ninety days of the 
preliminary hearing or the date the parolee waived it.69 There is a right to 
counsel at this hearing70 and the government need only prove the violation 
by a preponderance of the evidence.71 If a violation of parole is found, 
hearing officers have a number of dispositions at their disposal, including 
restoring the parolee to supervision, incarcerating the parolee but allowing 
for reinstatement of parole after a certain period of time has been served, or 
incarcerating the parolee for the balance of the period remaining on his 
parole, but for no more than five years, except in special cases.72 If 
imprisonment is imposed, the parolee’s criminal history, the original crime 
 
 62. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(3)(a)(i) (McKinney 2010); Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 4(1)–
(2). 
 63. Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 4(3). 
 64. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(3)(c)(iii).  
 65. Id. § 259-i(3)(c)(i); Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 4(3), (14). If there is a conviction on a 
criminal charge that arises out of the same conduct as the alleged parole violation, this constitutes 
probable cause that the parolee has violated a condition of release. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &  REGS. tit. 
9, § 8005.2(c) (2011). 
 66. Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 4(6). 
 67. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(3)(c)(iv). 
 68. Id. § 259-i(3)(d). 
 69. Id. § 259-i(3)(f)(i). If the parolee is convicted of a felony and sentenced, parole is revoked by 
law, so no preliminary or final revocation hearing is held. Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 4(7). 
 70. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i (3)(f)(5). 
 71. Id. § 259-i(3)(f)(viii). 
 72. Id. § 259-i(3)(f)(x). See also id. § 259-i(3)(g) (“Revocation of presumptive release, parole, 
conditional release or post-release supervision shall not prevent re-parole or re-release provided such re-
parole or re-release is not inconsistent with any other provisions of law.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45 
(McKinney 2009) (setting forth periods of incarceration for violations of release); The Sentence Reform 
Act of 1998—Jenna’s Law, N.Y. STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS & COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, 
https://www.parole.ny.gov/legislation-jl.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (“Violations of post-release 
supervision may result in reincarceration for a fixed term between six months and the unserved balance 
of the post-release supervision term, not to exceed five years.”). 
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of conviction, the number of prior violations, and the current violative 
behavior determine the range of imprisonment.73 For some serious 
offenses, there can be a mandatory term of at least fifteen months.74  
In New York, then, parolees facing revocation hearings can be held up 
to 105 days pending the hearing, and can face additional years of 
imprisonment if a violation is established. Yet all this occurs under a lower 
burden of proof and without all of the usual procedural protections that 
accompany such lengthy terms of incarceration.  
D.  PAROLE AND RECIDIVISM 
At the end of 2011, there were approximately 853,900 people on 
parole in the United States, with 1.1 million in the parole system at some 
stage during the year.75 The vast majority were state parolees—744,700, 
compared to 103,800 federal releasees—but the number of parolees in both 
jurisdictions is increasing.76  
Historical trends indicate that many of those released on parole will be 
reincarcerated. Parolees serving time as a result of a revocation make up 
over half of the jail population and over one-third of the prison 
population.77 Only about half of parolees complete their terms of 
supervision, including those who are discharged early.78 Reincarceration 
rates vary by year and by study, but a significant number of parolees are 
reincarcerated—42% of parolees returned to jail or prison during their 
parole term in 2000;79 in 2006, 16% of parolees were reincarcerated;80 and 
in 2011, 20% were reincarcerated, 5% with a new sentence and 13% due to 
 
 73. Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 4(11).  
 74. Id. § 4(12).  
 75. LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & ERIKA PARKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND 
PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011, at 1 (2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/ppus11.pdf. 
 76. During 2011, the state parole population grew 1.1 percent while the federal population grew 
5.1 percent. Id. During that time, parole entries declined by 3.4 percent but exits declined even more, by 
5.3 percent. Id.  
 77. Klingele, supra note 46, at 5, 17 (using data from PEGGY BURKE ET AL., PEW CTR. ON 
STATES, WHEN OFFENDERS BREAK THE RULES: SMART RESPONSES TO PAROLE AND PROBATION 
VIOLATIONS 1 (2007)). 
 78. MARUSCHAK & PARKS, supra note 75, at 1. 
 79. TIMOTHY HUGHES & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REENTRY 
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
reentry.pdf.  
 80. LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION 
AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006, at 7 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/ppus06.pdf. 
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revocation.81 The numbers may vary, but consistently “a major proportion 
of offenders failing upon reentry—and returning to prison—are doing so as 
a result of parole violations and revocations.”82 
Many revocations are based upon technical violations rather than the 
commission of new crimes.83 In fact, in some states, technical violations 
make up the majority of revocations.84 As one parole officer put it: 
[M]ost of our violations are technical . . . . I mean, if you can’t 
write up a report, and cite at least a technical violation, you’re not 
really struggling very hard, because there are so many conditions. 
There’s got to be something that the guy didn’t do right, right?”85 
Consequently, the various parole conditions effectively give police 
officers and parole offices enormous discretion over parolees’ fates—a 
form of leverage we explore in Part III.B. 
E.  HOW TO ASSESS THE MERITS OF THE PAROLE SYSTEM 
From the individual’s point of view, it may seem obvious that even 
with massive restrictions imposed during the period of parole, parole 
overall nevertheless operates as a positive for convicts because it gets them 
out of jail. One problem with this conclusion is that in the federal system, 
parole adds an additional term to a convict’s sentence, rather than reducing 
it. Given resource constraints, prison overcrowding, and goals of optimal 
sentencing,86 it is unlikely that in the absence of parole, sentences would 
 
 81. MARUSCHAK & PARKS, supra note 75, at 1. 
 82. PEGGY BURKE & MICHAEL TONRY, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. POLICY, SUCCESSFUL 
TRANSITION AND REENTRY FOR SAFER COMMUNITIES: A CALL TO ACTION FOR PAROLE 7 (2006), 
available at http://www.cepp.com/documents/A%20Call%20to%20Action%20for%20Parole.pdf. 
 83. PEW CTR. ON STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S 
PRISONS 13–14 (2011), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/ 
Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/State_Recidivism_Revolving_Door_America_Prisons%20.pdf 
(showing that across 33 states, 25.5% of parolees returned to prison for technical violations, whereas 
only 19.9% returned for new crimes). 
 84. E.g., PEW CTR. ON STATES, WHEN OFFENDERS BREAK THE RULES: SMART RESPONSES TO 
PAROLE AND PROBATION VIOLATIONS 3 (2007), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/ 
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/Condition-Violators-Briefing.pdf 
(“A significant number of returns . . . are solely for violations of the conditions of probation or 
parole . . . . In some states, these so-called ‘technical’ or ‘condition’ violators account for more than half 
of all those returned to prison.”); B.J. Reyes, Isle Parole Failure Rate 43%: A Study Finds That the 
Majority of Revocations Were for Technical Reasons, Such as Drug Violations, Rather Than for New 
Convictions, HONOLULU STAR-BULL. (Aug. 16, 2001), http://archives.starbulletin.com/ 
2001/08/16/news/index.html. 
 85. Klingele, supra note 46, at 1035. 
 86. An extensive economic literature exists that analyzes the most efficient and effective 
mechanisms of deterring crime by varying the extent of punishment, and other factors. See, e.g., James 
Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime? 
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remain as high as the combined parole and nonparole period of existing 
sentences. Even putting this thought experiment aside, the fact that most 
parolees are returned to prison for technical violations of their parole 
conditions does not mean that at worst parole simply returns them to 
neutral. The next subpart shows that parole violations can ultimately cause 
individuals to serve longer sentences than they would without parole, even 
extending sentences beyond the legislative maximum. So it is not clear that 
parole actually reduces prison sentences. 
Furthermore, the parole system worsens the institutionalization of 
individuals—parole contributes to the recidivism statistics described above, 
not simply because technical violations are easy to establish, but because 
the extensive parole conditions that we describe in Part III.B make parolees 
vulnerable to criminal influences. Thus, even for parolees whose initial 
sentences are shortened, if parole contributes to the probability of their 
return to prison, that sentence reduction does them little good. 
The Supreme Court justifies stringent parole conditions as a Faustian 
bargain to which the parolees may choose to consent.87 In fact, as we have 
seen, parole is often a mandatory addition to a sentence, so the consent 
argument is misleading. Furthermore, parole conditions have become so 
onerous as to be counterproductive, leading to greater reincarceration. 
Thus, whether parole’s partial freedom trumps prison’s complete 
incarceration may actually be the wrong way to look at the question, since 
a parolee’s relative freedom may be illusory.  
Nevertheless, in discretionary cases, the individual may think 
probabilistically that he can beat these odds, and we may want to allow him 
to make that calculation, given his greater knowledge about his character 
and prospects of successful reentry under parole. But while a parolee may 
be free to consent to stringent and potentially counterproductive conditions, 
the community in which he resides does not have the same choice. We 
show in Part II.A that the rights of the community are also adversely 
affected by the parole system, and in Part IV we show that the broader 
neighborhoods in which parolees cluster are targeted by the police for 
nonrandom stops at a significantly higher rate. The Supreme Court may be 
 
22 RAND J. ECON. 385, 393 (1991) (theorizing that “increasing penalties may actually increase crime 
rates”); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders, 
46 J. PUB. ECON. 291, 302-03 (1991) (arguing that maximal deterrence may require variation in 
punishment levels on an individual basis); Steven Shavell, A Model of Optimal Incapacitation, 77 AM. 
ECON. REV. 107, 109 (1987) (noting that the optimal sentence may change based on whether the goal of 
incarceration is either incapacitation or deterrence). 
 87. See infra Part II.B. 
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willing to infer consent on behalf of the parolee, but surely it cannot extend 
that inference to the broader community. 
Ultimately, we are not proposing that parole in and of itself is 
necessarily problematic, but the existing parole system is deeply flawed. 
Parole as it actually operates in the United States today is not the 
reintegrative, sentence-reducing mechanism that most of us think it is. 
Parole conditions are so harsh that they undermine the reintegrative goals 
of parole, do not reduce sentences, and harm the constitutional rights of 
both individual parolees and the communities in which they live. 
II.  IMPACT ON THE PAROLEE: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
In this part, we examine the parole jurisprudence and demonstrate the 
adverse impact it has on the constitutional rights of both parolees and the 
broader community. Subpart A begins with the Fourth Amendment, 
showing how parole jurisprudence undermines the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures not only for individual parolees but also 
for their families and cotenants. Subpart B turns to the Sixth Amendment, 
showing that parole can extend parolees’ sentences, even beyond the 
legislatively allowed maximum. Subpart C explores the detrimental effect 
on procedural rights, including evidentiary rules, revocation and bail, the 
exclusionary rule, and Miranda rights.  
Although the prior literature has addressed most of these issues in 
isolation, they have seldom, if ever, been considered in terms of their 
collective effect on atrophying constitutional rights. Pulling all the threads 
of parole jurisprudence together challenges the common assumption that 
parole provides a helpful mechanism for the reintegration of criminal 
offenders into the community. 
A.  ATTRITION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND 
COMMUNITIES 
The Fourth Amendment applies to parolees, but only in a considerably 
weakened form. The courts have allowed numerous punitive conditions to 
be placed on parolees as part of the bargain with the state that lets them exit 
prison early. 
1.  Samson and the Abolition of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that people on parole have 
diminished expectations of privacy that can justify searches and seizures 
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without the typical probable cause and warrant requirements.88 Unlike 
searches and seizures of ordinary citizens, searches and seizures of parolees 
need only be reasonable.89 Thus, not only are warrantless searches possible, 
but police do not need, as they ordinarily would, facts and circumstances 
that would make a “man of reasonable caution” sufficiently certain that an 
offense has been committed.90 Instead, reasonableness requires only a 
balance between “on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for 
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”91 Furthermore, in 
Samson v. California, the Supreme Court deemed parolees to have such a 
diminished expectation of privacy that even suspicionless searches can be 
authorized.92  
The Samson rule provides little restriction on police searches. Parolees 
can be made subject to privacy infringements that may not be reasonable if 
they involved ordinary citizens,93 including requiring all parolees to agree 
to be subject to searches at any time by police and parole officers in order 
to be eligible for release.94 These intrusions need only be made pursuant to 
a rule or regulation “that itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness requirement,”95 and must also be “clearly expressed” to the 
parolee.96 That is, police do not automatically have the power to search 
parolees without suspicion, but legislatures can so empower them, and the 
 
 88. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006) (“The extent and reach of [parole] conditions 
clearly demonstrate that parolees . . . have severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their 
status alone.”). 
 89. Samson, 547 U.S. at 847 (quoting People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 450 (Cal. 1998)) (affirming 
the California Court of Appeal’s holdings that “suspicionless searches of parolees are lawful under 
California law” and that “[s]uch a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as 
long as it is not arbitrary, capricious or harassing” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Pa. Bd. of Prob. 
& Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998) (implicitly recognizing the right of parolees to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures). See also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (same, 
discussing probationers). 
 90. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 322 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Stacey 
v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878)) (“If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to 
warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed, it is 
sufficient.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 91. Samson, 547 U.S. at 848 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2005)). 
 92. Id. at 847. 
 93. Id. at 863 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Grimes, 225 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(“[W]e hold that, like probation, parole justifies some departure from traditional Fourth Amendment 
standards.”). 
 94. Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (West 2000)). 
 95. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). 
 96. Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 (“[T]he parole search condition under California law—requiring 
inmates who opt for parole to submit to suspicionless searches by a parole officer . . . was ‘clearly 
expressed’ to petitioner.”). 
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legislation itself is only subject to a reasonableness test. 
The reasonableness test offers little meaningful restriction on what 
legislatures can make parolees subject to. In justifying its lax standard, the 
Samson Court characterized parole as one form of punishment on a 
continuum, ranging from imprisonment to relative freedom.97 
“[A]n . . . inmate may serve his parole period either in physical custody”—
with all of the restrictions that apply in prison—or else he may “elect to 
complete his sentence out of physical custody and subject to certain 
conditions.”98 The Court, then, is characterizing parole, regardless of the 
extent of the conditions associated with it, as a partial reprieve that 
prisoners voluntarily consent to, since prison is the alternative.  
Under Samson, suspicionless searches are almost always reasonable 
for two reasons. First, the expectation of privacy of parolees is severely 
diminished because the “extent and reach of these conditions clearly 
demonstrate that parolees like petitioner have severely diminished 
expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone.”99 On the Court’s 
circular reasonable expectation of privacy logic, the fact that so many 
conditions are placed on parolees shows that they must have diminished 
expectations of privacy, which in turn renders punitive conditions 
reasonable. Second, by characterizing the conditions as minimally 
intrusive—since the alternative is prison rather than freedom—the Court 
minimizes the intrusiveness of any police action. In contrast, the 
countervailing state interests are considered substantial, since the very high 
recidivism rate among parolees demonstrates that “most parolees are ill 
prepared to handle the pressures of reintegration. Thus, most parolees 
require intense supervision.”100 However, we show below how punitive 
parole conditions actually contribute to likely recidivism. 
In addition to the above justifications, the Court intimates that 
parolees can offer no serious constitutional objection to parole conditions 
because they consented to those conditions. Such consent was indicated by 
the fact that the inmate “signed an order submitting to the condition and 
thus was ‘unambiguously’ aware of it . . . . [His] acceptance of a clear and 
unambiguous search condition ‘significantly diminished [his] reasonable 
expectation of privacy.’”101 As we have seen, parole periods are often 
 
 97. Id. at 850. 
 98. Id. at 851. 
 99. Id. at 852. 
 100. Id. at 854 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2005)). 
 101. Id. at 852. 
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mandatory, and so the consent justification is often inapt; in addition, we 
will see in subpart B below that the core benefit assumed to arise from 
parole—reduced sentences—can be illusory, and so this inferred consent is 
difficult to characterize as truly knowing.  
It is unclear whether New York takes full advantage of Samson’s 
authorization of suspicionless searches. New York’s parole regulations 
permit warrantless searches, but whether they allow suspicionless searches 
of parolees is still an open question. In New York, a parolee signs a consent 
form upon release to permit his parole officer to visit him and to “permit 
the search and inspection of his person, residence and property.”102 But the 
New York courts have held that this is not an unconditional consent to any 
search, applying it only to those conditions that are “rationally and 
reasonably” related to the parole officer’s duty.103 The burden is on the 
state to show that the parolee consented to the search.104 This includes 
showing that the consent is voluntary and free from implicit or express 
coercion.105 In Part III.B, we demonstrate that even though New York law 
may not fully replicate Samson’s full permissiveness, parolees nonetheless 
find themselves subject to intensive police leverage. 
2.  Samson Meets Randolph: Loss of Privacy for Family and Cotenants of 
Parolees 
Parole not only reduces the Fourth Amendment rights of individual 
parolees, but also it erodes the constitutional protections of anyone the 
parolee happens to live with. It is well established that joint occupants with 
equal authority to control access to shared residences can consent to 
searches of common areas and jointly occupied areas.106 What is not settled 
is whether, given Samson’s permissive attitude toward police searches of 
parolees’ persons and their homes, individuals who live with parolees face 
a loss of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 
The potential attrition of nonparolee Fourth Amendment interests 
through the combination of the common authority rules with Samson’s 
presumption of consent is somewhat lightened, though certainly not 
negated, by the Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v. Randolph.107 That 
 
 102. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8003.2(d) (2011). 
 103. People v. Huntley, 371 N.E.2d 794, 796–97 (N.Y. 1977); People v. Tony, 914 N.Y.S.2d 585, 
592 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 104. Tony, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 592. 
 105. People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 580 (N.Y. 1976). 
 106. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 107. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
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ruling partially limited the scope of the common authority rule, holding that 
“a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police 
search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow 
occupant.”108 This means that any evidence found in a search cannot be 
used against the nonconsenting party, when the latter is present and 
objecting. Randolph thus raises questions about the effect of Samson on 
nonparolees in the home, but we argue it offers little meaningful protection 
for nonparolees living with parolees. 
If two cohabitants are present, one of whom consents to an otherwise 
unjustified search while the other “expressly refuses to consent,” the 
“refusal . . . prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and 
invalid as to him.”109 But this quote illustrates the considerable limits of 
Randolph’s protection for nonparolees living with parolees, in two ways. 
First, it only applies when both individuals are present and able to object—
otherwise, the ordinary common authority rule prevails. Second, Randolph 
only renders use of such searches as against the nonconsenting nonparolee 
impermissible; it does not prevent the search from taking place. Thus it 
does little to protect nonparolees living with parolees from unreasonable 
searches and seizures actually being conducted. As described below, this 
area of the law has previously been criticized for providing little protection 
from unreasonable searches, since numerous exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule allow evidence to be indirectly used against an individual for whom it 
cannot be used directly, such as for credibility purposes.110 This is 
particularly true in the parole context, since Samson gives an inference of 
all-but-blanket consent to searches of parolees’ homes. Moreover, the 
implied consent of the parolee appears to foreclose the possibility that the 
nonparolee cotenant can obtain any remedy for unjustified searches under 
federal civil rights laws. 
In Thornton v. Lund, for example, a court rejected the argument that 
an officer’s reasonable belief that a parolee lived at a residence diminished 
the nonparolee cohabitants’ Fourth Amendment rights.111 But even so, the 
court noted that the search was valid as against the parolee,112 refused to 
allow the nonparolee’s nonconsent to prevent searches such as this, and 
 
 108. Id. at 122–23. See also People v. Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d 335, 344 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (citing 
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114) (“The police may not, however, search a residence, even with the consent of 
one resident, when a co-occupant is physically present and refuses to consent.”).  
 109. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106. 
 110. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 111. Thornton v. Lund, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056–57 (E.D. Wis. 2008). 
 112. Id. at 1059 n.4. 
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also granted a summary dismissal of the nonparolee’s § 1983 damages 
claim.113 If anything, then, the Randolph compromise of allowing a search 
but preventing its use legitimates the process of searching the homes of 
nonparolees living with parolees.  
So Randolph does little to limit unreasonable searches actually taking 
place; combined with the fact that Randolph does not even apply unless a 
cotenant happens to be present, this means that Samson’s narrow reading of 
parolee rights has considerable potential adverse impacts on parolees’ 
families and cotenants. When it is considered that at any time, one in three 
African American men are under some form of criminal justice 
supervision,114 the potential impact of Samson amounts to potentially 
lowered rights for entire neighborhoods. Our empirical analysis in Part IV 
supports this conclusion. 
It is also worth considering the feedback effect that Samson’s attrition 
of community rights has back onto the parolee. As will be discussed in Part 
III.B, stable housing and social and familial relationships are the best 
predictors of successful reintegration of parolees, but people just released 
from prison typically will not have the financial resources to pay the rent, 
and even if they could, landlords may be loath to rent to people with 
criminal records. Many parolees will have difficulty finding employment 
for the same reason, and it can be difficult to find jobs that do not conflict 
with their reporting requirements. Furthermore, federal laws severely 
restrict the ability of individuals with felony convictions for drugs or 
violence from living in public housing115 and receiving public benefits.116 
Thus, most parolees must rely on others to provide them with a place to 
live. However, the constant risk of state intervention created by Samson is a 
 
 113. Id. at 1060 (“Given that [parolee William] consented to searches of his residence as a 
condition of parole and defendants reasonably believed that William lived with plaintiffs, it was 
reasonable for defendants to believe that they could lawfully search plaintiffs’ home over their 
objections. As such, defendants are immune from damages liability.” (citation omitted)). 
 114. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 115. 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c) (2006) (allowing local housing authorities to refuse housing to people 
“engaged in any drug-related or violent criminal activity”); id. § 13663(a) (prohibiting admission of 
“any individual who is subject to a lifetime registration requirement” to federally assisted housing); 24 
C.F.R. § 960.204(a)(3)–(4) (2012) (applying the same to registered sex offenders and individuals with 
convictions for the manufacture of methamphetamine). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2006) 
(permitting housing authorities to evict residents for “drug-related criminal activity on or off such 
premises” by tenants or guests of tenants); Gwen Rubenstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and 
Housing—Denial of Benefits to Drug Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 37, 48 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) 
(discussing the effects of federal housing policies excluding people with criminal records). 
 116. Federal law imposes a lifetime ban on the receipt of welfare and food stamps for those with a 
felony drug conviction. 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (2012). 
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significant disincentive for others to share their homes with parolees.117 
Consequently, parole conditions can actually undermine the social and 
familial relationships integral to successful reentry.118  
B.  FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT ATTRITION: PAROLE AS EXTENDING 
SENTENCES 
This subpart describes the statutory and constitutional justifications 
for the rulings that allow parole to extend sentences, and why this outcome 
has been held to not violate the Sixth Amendment and other constitutional 
criminal procedure protections. We provide a number of critiques of the 
courts’ reasoning in developing this jurisprudence, showing how it is 
internally inconsistent. But the ultimate purpose of this subpart is to place 
this jurisprudence in the broader context of the counter-productively 
punitive institution of parole, which undermines parole’s reintegrative 
aims. 
1.  Statutory Empowerment for Reimprisonment Beyond a Term 
Authorized by the Conviction Statute 
The federal supervised release statute permits reincarceration of an 
offender for all or part of the remaining time on his supervised release,119 
from one up to five years depending on the class of the original offense.120 
The courts have interpreted this statutory power as permitting them to 
incarcerate an individual for a prison term that, together with time already 
served by the parolee, exceeds the total allowed by the statute of 
conviction. Defendants have challenged these sentences both for 
improperly interpreting the federal statutes and on constitutional 
grounds.121 This section examines the statutory issues; the next section 
 
 117. Alice Goffman, On the Run: Wanted Men in a Philadelphia Ghetto, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 339, 
350 (2009). 
 118. James M. Binnall, Released from Prison . . . but Placed in Solitary Confinement: A Parolee 
Reveals the Practical Ramifications of Samson v. California, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 65, 86 (2008) (“Suspicionless searches ended my ability to choose with whom to share 
the intimate details of my life . . . . Secrecy and withdrawal again dominate my life. ”); Donna Lee Elm, 
Limits on the Search Waiver Term, PERSP.: J. AM. PROBATION & PAROLE ASS’N, Spring 2003, at 42, 42 
(“Throughout the United States, probationers and parolees are subject to release conditions requiring 
them to submit to search and seizure by authorities.”). 
 119. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012) (providing that a court may require a defendant to serve in 
prison “all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in 
such term of supervised release”). 
 120. The maximum term of re-imprisonment is also limited by the class of the original offense. A 
class A felony has a five year maximum; a class B felony three years; a class C or D felony two years; 
and one year for any other kind of offense. Id. 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Jamison, 934 F.2d 371, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (examining both 
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examines the constitutional arguments. 
The courts have discretion over the combined length of parolees’ 
sentences, as they may choose whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences of imprisonment for a violation of supervised release, based on a 
list of factors,122 and the court has the choice to not give credit for time 
previously served on post-release supervision.123 However, the Sentencing 
Guidelines are more categorical and stricter, providing that if a court 
imprisons a parolee for violating a condition of release, the sentence shall 
be served consecutively, even if the sentence being served was imposed for 
the very conduct that violated the terms of release.124 Although the 
Sentencing Guidelines constitute only a nonbinding policy statement,125 
they were intended to encourage consecutive, and thus longer, sentences.126  
Courts have interpreted the combination of these provisions as 
empowering them to sentence individuals to prison terms that, in total, 
exceed the legislative maximum provided for in the relevant statute of 
conviction.127 In many instances, courts have exploited this power, 
sentencing parolees to terms of re-imprisonment which, when added to 
their initial incarceration, exceed the length permitted by the statute of 
conviction.128  
The statute of conviction typically specifies the maximum time 
someone can be imprisoned for the crime. Sentences for supervised release 
violations relate back to the original offense.129 Therefore, a number of 
defendants have argued, the prison sentence for a release violation cannot, 
as a matter of statutory interpretation, exceed the maximum length 
 
statutory and Constitutional challenges to this sort of sentence); United States v. Purvis, 940 F.2d 1276, 
1278 (9th Cir. 1991) (same). 
 122. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (listing factors); id. § 3583(c) (referring to § 3553(a)). See also supra 
Part I. 
 123. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 
 124. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.3(f) (2013). 
 125. United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 208 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 126. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.3(f) & cmt. 4. 
 127. See, e.g., United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 488–91 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the facts 
underlying a revocation of supervised release that exceeds the maximum sentence need not be proven 
beyond reasonable doubt). 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. McIntosh, 630 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) (“In McIntosh’s case, 
adding his second reimprisonment (16 months) to his initial imprisonment (41 months) and the 
reimprisonment from the first violation of supervised release (14 months) gives a total of 71 months. 
This, of course, is greater than the 60–month statutory maximum authorized for his original offense.”). 
 129. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (“We therefore attribute postrevocation 
penalties to the original conviction.”). 
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provided in the statute of conviction.130  
The core difficulty with this argument is that the conviction statute is 
not the sole source of legal authority for imprisoning an offender. In 
addition, the supervised release statute provides an independent basis for 
sentencing an offender to a term of release, and, if he violates its 
restrictions, to additional imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit captured the 
central statutory issue succinctly, stating:  
[A] district court’s authority to sentence is not based solely on [the 
statute of conviction], but on 18 U.S.C. § 3583 as well. That is to 
say, by statute, a district court is not restricted to only imposing a 
sentence of up to 60 months; instead, by statute, a district court 
may impose a 60-month sentence plus a three-year term of 
supervised release, which may include an additional 
reimprisonment of up to two years should the defendant violate 
terms of the supervised release.131 
Every other circuit addressing the issue has reached the same 
conclusion.132  
2.  Reimprisonment Beyond a Term Authorized by the Conviction Statute: 
Constitutional Issues 
Reimprisonment beyond the term authorized by the explicit text of the 
statute under which the defendant is convicted would seem to be directly at 
odds with a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment’s procedural rights, the 
Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against double jeopardy, and the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments’ requirement of due process. However, the courts 
have turned back all constitutional challenges to § 3583, allowing sentences 
of imprisonment that exceed the maximum allowed by the conviction 
 
 130. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1282, 1283 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the 
defendant’s statutory argument that “because he had served the maximum sentence (five years) 
provided by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the judge had no authority to impose an additional term of 
imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3583”). 
 131. McIntosh, 630 F.3d at 702. See also United States v. Hoffman, 733 F. Supp. 314, 315 (D. 
Alaska 1990) (“Other statutory provisions [than the sentencing provisions], of equal dignity, provide for 
the possibility of additional time in prison amounting to a total in excess of one year.”). 
 132. E.g., United States v. Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264, 1266–68 (11th Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Johnson, 356 F. App’x 785, 790–92 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished opinion); United States v. Cordova, 
461 F.3d 1184, 1186–88 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Huerta–Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1224–25 
(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 854–55 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Carlton, 
442 F.3d 802, 807–10 (2d Cir. 2006); Work, 409 F.3d at 489–92. See also United States v. Wirth, 250 
F.3d 165, 170 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[It is a] well-settled rule that punishment for a violation of 
supervised release, when combined with punishment for the original offense, may exceed the statutory 
maximum for the underlying substantive offense.”).  
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statute to stand.133 The focus of these decisions has not been on the length 
of the resulting sentence per se,134 but rather on parolees’ procedural rights 
at their violation hearings.  
a.  Right to jury trial 
The most frequent challenges to violation sentences that exceed the 
conviction statute’s maximum are based on the right to a jury trial 
recognized in a series of Supreme Court cases culminating in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey135 and United States v. Booker.136 In these cases, the Court held 
that the Constitution’s guarantee of the right to a jury trial prohibits the 
imposition of sentences above the statutory maximum other than those 
based on facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.137 Applying this 
principle, the Court invalidated several mandatory sentencing schemes, 
although it allowed judges to impose a sentence on preponderant evidence 
if the guidelines were merely advisory.138 Since the supervised release 
statute permits a judge to reincarcerate someone beyond the maximum 
permitted by the conviction statute without a jury and with only 
preponderant evidence, parolees have argued that the statute infringes the 
right to a jury trial recognized in Apprendi and Booker.139  
i.  Judicial Fact-Finding 
One basis for arguing that these revocation sentences violate the 
Apprendi-Booker principle is that the statute authorizing them allows a 
judge to punish someone without a jury determination and with only 
preponderant evidence. The courts have consistently rejected this challenge 
by asserting that the constitutionality of the whole sentence is a function of 
the constitutionality of each of its various parts.140 One part is the 
“incarcerative term” authorized by the conviction statute; the other part is 
 
 133. Carlton, 442 F.3d at 809 (noting some tension between the supervised release statute and the 
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial). 
 134. The Court generally avoids “articulat[ing] the scope of the constitutional interest in the 
substantive criminal law.” Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: 
Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 199 (2005). 
 135. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  
 136. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 137. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 138. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
 139. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 807 (“Appellant asserts that § 3583(e)(3) is 
invalid as applied to him because it empowers a district court to revoke his term of supervised release 
without a jury trial and based on findings that are not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of 
his constitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.”). 
 140. United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 490 (1st Cir. 2005). 
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the supervised release term authorized by the supervised release statute.141 
Rather than considering these two parts of the sentence together and 
assessing their constitutionality, the courts have simply asked whether each 
element is constitutional standing alone, ignoring the cumulative impact of 
the two parts. 
In United States v. Work, for instance, the First Circuit reasoned that at 
the sentencing stage, the incarceration term was supported by the facts 
admitted by the defendant during his guilty plea and thus there was no 
violation of the jury trial right.142 Furthermore, at the time he was 
sentenced, the supervised release statute permitted the court to sentence 
him to supervised release for up to three years. “Since . . . the supervised 
release statute . . . authorized the court to impose a supervised release term 
of that duration based solely on the facts admitted in the guilty plea,” the 
supervised release term also did not violate the defendant’s right to a jury 
trial.143  
Having found that the original sentencing court did not violate the 
defendant’s jury trial right, the Work court then turned its attention to the 
revocation of supervised release. The court argued that the Apprendi 
principle does not apply at the revocation stage because “violation of 
supervised release is not a separate fact creating an additional penalty on 
top of a defendant’s original sentence that may go beyond the statutory 
maximum.”144 Rather, the “possibility of reimprisonment after a violation” 
was “part of the original sentence” to begin with.145 Since the possibility of 
reimprisonment was in the sentence from the start, it cannot be considered 
“an additional penalty on top of” the original sentence.146  
The court acknowledged that the revocation judge extended the 
offender’s imprisonment after he found release violations by a mere 
preponderance of the evidence, but concluded that this did not infringe the 
right to jury trial as recognized by the Supreme Court because the Sixth 
Amendment does not apply to revocation hearings.147 Since the releasee 
has already been convicted of a crime, he need not be “accorded” the same 
 
 141. Id. at 489. 
 142. Id. at 491. 
 143. Id. 
 144. United States v. McIntosh, 630 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. See also United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“[I]mposition of imprisonment following the revocation of supervised release is part of the original 
sentence authorized by the fact of conviction and does not constitute additional punishment beyond the 
statutory maximum.”). 
 147. Work, 409 F.3d at 491 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). 
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“panoply of due process protections” as a criminal defendant.148 Essentially 
the Work and other courts argue that since revocation occurs subsequent to 
conviction, they need not address whether the actual imposition of the 
additional term through revocation violates the Constitution, since the Sixth 
Amendment does not apply.  
Thus the court was arguing first that it is permissible to impose a 
potential additional incarceration term at sentencing that might exceed the 
statutory maximum for the crime of conviction if imposed, and second that 
it is permissible to impose the additional term of actualized incarceration at 
the revocation stage, on a preponderance of the evidence and without a jury 
determination, because the Sixth Amendment no longer applies at the 
revocation stage.  
The two justifications are at odds with one another. To justify the 
sentence at the sentencing stage, the court insists that the two elements of 
the sentence must be considered separately. However, to justify the 
sentence at the revocation stage, the court insists that the two elements 
must be considered together. If the implicit factual claim in the second 
argument—that the two aspects of sentencing are one and the same—is 
accurate, then this directly challenges the evidentiary rule that permits 
incarceration upon only a preponderance of the evidence. 
Also, the court avoided the underlying question at the sentencing 
stage, by leaping from the Booker conclusion that the guidelines cannot be 
mandatory if they are constitutional to the conclusion that therefore 
extending sentences beyond the maximum is not a constitutional 
violation.149 But it never actually elucidated why, if the revocation term is 
part of the original sentence, then it need not be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt at the first stage. The court then avoided the substance of 
that argument at the revocation stage, only because the Sixth Amendment 
does not apply to the revocation. But this only follows if the imposition of 
the two sentences are separate events—contrary to its earlier position. 
Nevertheless, other courts have followed this approach.150 
 
 148. Id. at 492. 
 149. Id. at 492 (“[T]he portions of the sentencing guidelines dealing with revocation of supervised 
release are merely policy statements. Even before Booker, those guidelines were deemed advisory 
rather than mandatory . . . . Consequently, resort to them cannot constitute Booker error.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 150. See, e.g., United States v. McIntosh, 630 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[S]upervised 
release, and the subsequent possibility of reimprisonment after a violation of that release, is a part of the 
original sentence imposed by the sentencing court following a defendant’s conviction by a jury based 
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”).  
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Some courts have recognized the conflict between the § 3583 
jurisprudence and the Apprendi-Booker principle. In United States v. 
Carlton, the Second Circuit upheld a revocation sentence but 
acknowledged some “tension” between its ruling and the right to a jury 
determination of all relevant facts.151 According to the Carlton court, the 
tension arises because, despite the Supreme Court’s contrary assertion, a 
court “cannot fully attribute the penalty imposed at a revocation hearing to 
the original conviction.”152 The facts that justify revocation occur after 
conviction, and certainly “a jury cannot find facts which the law makes 
essential to the punishment . . . if those facts have not yet occurred.”153 
Courts are not like the police unit in Minority Report, which can incarcerate 
offenders for “future murder.” 
Nonetheless, the Carlton court ultimately concluded that there is no 
violation of the right to jury trial at the revocation hearing because “a 
sentence of supervised release by its terms involves a surrender of certain 
constitutional rights and this includes surrender of the due process rights 
articulated in Apprendi and its progeny.”154 Thus the ultimate justification 
for the failure of the right to jury fact-finding as protecting against 
sentences extending beyond the legislative maximum comes down to a 
notion of the parolee having impliedly consented to the framework of 
conditions imposed by the state, however punitive it may be. This argument 
circularly concludes that the Constitution is not violated because courts can 
presume consent to a system that would violate offenders’ constitutional 
rights but for that consent. We see below that problems with this logic 
continue to arise when violations of other constitutional provisions are 
considered, in particular the prohibition on double jeopardy.155 
ii.  Mandatory Guidelines 
A distinct, though closely related, Apprendi challenge to revocation 
sentences contends that judges’ revocation decisions are mandatory under 
the Sentencing Guidelines. The answer to this challenge is the same as that 
proffered by Booker as to why the Sentencing Guidelines in general did not 
violate Apprendi: the Sentencing Guidelines for revocation were merely 
advisory before Booker and remained so after.156 Others have argued that 
 
 151. United States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 808 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 152. Id. at 809. 
 153. Id. (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 154. Id.  
 155. See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
 156. United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Because the 
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this claim in Booker was a disingenuous legalism manufactured to avoid 
the practical difficulties of the Sentencing Guidelines being 
unconstitutional under Apprendi,157 and we will not reiterate the argument 
here. 
b.  Double Jeopardy 
Courts have appealed to some of the same nuances of release 
revocation to reject double jeopardy challenges. The relevant aspect of the 
right against double jeopardy “protects [a defendant] against multiple 
punishments for the same offense.”158 Courts have circumvented this 
double jeopardy restriction on expanding sentences beyond the statutory 
maximum based on the rationale that although parole revocation relates 
back to the original offense, it is not a second punishment implicating 
double jeopardy because it merely “modifie[s]” the original sentence.159 
Imprisonment for a violation is not a new punishment, on this logic, but is 
rather only one “part of the whole matrix of punishment which arises out of 
a defendant’s original crime.”160 
This factual characterization of parole revocation, and why it does not 
violate double jeopardy, is directly at odds with the factual characterization 
used to justify why parole revocation does not violate the right to jury trial. 
Previously, we saw that the courts justified parole revocation on the basis 
that the possibility of reimprisonment was part of the original sentence to 
begin with. Now, the court is saying that the second punishment, parole 
revocation, is a modification of the original sentence. If the latter claim is 
true, then the imposition of that sentence without proof beyond reasonable 
doubt by a jury becomes problematic again. 
c.  The Indictment Clause 
The courts are split on whether the extension of sentencing via parole 
might conflict with the Indictment Clause of the Constitution.161 The 
 
revocation of supervised release and the subsequent imposition of additional imprisonment is, and 
always has been, fully discretionary, it is constitutional under Booker.”); United States v. Dees, 467 
F.3d 847, 854 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a Booker challenge to a sentence under § 3583(e)(3) and citing 
the advisory character of the revocation guidelines). 
 157. E.g., Allen & Hastert, supra note 134, at 198–200. 
 158. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (citing cases). 
 159. United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480, 487 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The requirement that a defendant 
only be punished once for a particular crime does not mean that this punishment cannot be modified or 
extended.”). 
 160. United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 884 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Paskow, 
11 F.3d 873, 883 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 161. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury . . . .”). 
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Indictment Clause requires the government to indict defendants for 
offenses that “carry an authorized term of imprisonment of over one 
year.”162 Thus, the initial imposition of supervised release at sentencing is 
relevant to the Indictment Clause if the combined terms exceed one year, 
because supervised release necessarily contains the “possibility” that it will 
be “ultimately revoked.”163 However, other authority permits charging a 
misdemeanor that carries a penalty of one year of incarceration and one 
year of supervised release without an indictment.164 Since the possibility of 
reimprisonment is included in supervised release, this authority entails the 
permissibility of revoking supervised release without an indictment.  
The problem with the latter view is that it provides a way around the 
Indictment Clause for any punishment exceeding one year. All that a court 
needs to do is impose punishment of greater than one year that is 
conditional on an effectively unavoidable action. For instance, the court 
could make any fraternization with gang members trigger a condition to 
extend a punishment beyond a year, knowing that all prisons are rife with 
gangs and contact with gangs is effectively unavoidable for inmates. Thus 
if the logic that applies to supervised release is applied to punishments 
more broadly, the courts will have gutted the Indictment Clause entirely. 
Overall, the statutory authority for courts using parole revocation to 
extend sentences beyond the legislative maximum is quite clear, but the 
justifications given by the courts for why this practice does not violate the 
Constitution are muddled. If either of the courts’ factual characterizations 
of the relationship between parole revocation and initial sentences that are 
used to justify why sentence extension does not violate the jury fact-finding 
principle is accurate, then the practice must violate double jeopardy. The 
courts’ way around this quandary, like their treatment of the Indictment 
Clause difficulty, renders each of the relevant constitutional provisions 
effectively nullified. Thus courts are continually recharacterizing the same 
factual circumstances to avoid constitutional principles they have 
developed in other contexts. Although some courts have acknowledged 
these difficulties, more often courts have denied them, consistently 
upholding and applying imposition of sentences beyond the statutory 
maximum via parole revocation. Thus the most intuitive justification for 
parole—that it reduces prison sentences—has been shown to be illusory.  
 
 162. United States v. Purvis, 940 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 163. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 164. Id. 
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C.  PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AT REVOCATION: THE STATE’S LOWERED 
BURDEN 
This section examines the jurisprudence of the parole revocation 
hearing. The Supreme Court has justified limiting parolees’ due process 
and Fifth Amendment rights as well as relaxing evidentiary rules during 
these hearings on the basis that “revocation of parole is not part of a 
criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in 
such a proceeding does not apply.”165 The Court treats parole as a 
“variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals”166 and because their 
freedom is conditional, the Constitution gives states considerable flexibility 
to structure these proceedings more informally than criminal trials.167 As 
we discuss below, however, revocation hearings are often used in lieu of 
criminal prosecutions when the parolee commits a new criminal offense. 
To the extent that these proceedings are functioning as criminal trials, these 
decreased procedural protections essentially allow the state to sentence 
parolees to significant imprisonment without the constitutional protections 
that have been deemed indispensable to the fairness and accuracy of 
criminal trials. 
1.  Reduced Due Process Protections 
The Supreme Court has held that the revocation of parole is not a part 
of a criminal prosecution because “[r]evocation deprives an individual, not 
of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the 
conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole 
restrictions.”168 Therefore, parolees have more limited due process rights 
than defendants in criminal proceedings.169 These limited rights provide 
prosecutors with many incentives to proceed by way of revocation rather 
than a criminal trial. First, the standard of proof at a revocation hearing is a 
preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.170 Additionally, because these proceedings are deemed more 
informal than criminal trials, there are no “technical rules of procedure or 
 
 165. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). 
 166. Id. at 477. See also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) (“[P]arole is more akin to 
imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.”). 
 167. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998). 
 168. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480. 
 169. Id. (“[T]he full panoply of rights due a defendant in [a criminal prosecution] does not apply 
to parole revocations.”); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973). While Gagnon is a probation 
violation case, the U.S. Supreme Court treats parole and probation hearings identically. Id. at 782. 
 170. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012). 
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evidence.”171 For instance, hearsay is often admissible.172 Finally, although 
the hearing must be held before an independent party, that party “need not 
be a judicial officer.”173 Taken together, when a parolee is engaged in 
criminal conduct, it is far easier for the state to prove a parole violation 
than it is to obtain a criminal conviction.  
There is some minimal process to which parolees are constitutionally 
due. They must be given written notice of the alleged violation174 and are 
entitled to a preliminary hearing “as promptly as convenient after arrest” to 
determine whether probable cause exists to believe they are in violation of 
parole.175 If probable cause exists, they must be provided a final revocation 
hearing within a reasonable time to determine whether a violation 
occurred.176 One district court has held that parolees may be released on 
bail pending this final hearing.177 Finally, at this hearing, they have the 
right to be present, to introduce evidence,178 and a “conditional right” to 
confront witnesses.179 However, these rights may have little practical effect 
because the Court has also held that there is no guaranteed Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.180 Without the “guiding hand of counsel,”181 
it is questionable that parolees will be able to represent themselves 
effectively. 
The reduced procedural rights of parolees is a cutting-edge 
jurisprudential issue. The MacArthur Center for Justice at Northwestern 
University School of Law brought two lawsuits, both subject to pending 
consent decrees, in the district of Illinois challenging the failure of the 
courts to recognize the need for these procedural protections. M.H. v. 
Monreal182 and King v. Walker183 constitute class-action challenges to the 
 
 171. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786–87. 
 172. E.g., United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir. 2006).  
 173. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486. 
 174. Id. at 489. 
 175. Id. at 485. 
 176. Id. at 488 (holding that conducting a final revocation hearing two months after the parolee 
was arrested is not unreasonable). 
 177. United States v. Fernandez, 144 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118–19 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 178. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. 
 179. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2)(c) (“The 
person [at a revocation hearing] is entitled to . . . an opportunity to appear, present evidence, and 
question any adverse witness unless the court determines that the interest of justice does not require the 
witness to appear . . . .”); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 (describing limited right “to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses”). This conditional right means that hearsay can be admissible. 
 180. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790. 
 181. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). 
 182. M.H. v. Monreal, No. 1:12-CV-8523 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 23, 2012). 
 183. Amended Final Consent Decree, King v. Walker, No. 06-CV-204 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2014). 
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failure to provide juveniles and adults, respectively, with procedural rights, 
particularly: failure to provide notice and timely hearings, nonprovision of 
counsel, failures in fact checking, and, in the case of juveniles, failure to 
provide adult supervision during the process. 
2.  Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Miranda 
The Fifth Amendment gives individuals a right against being 
“compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”184 This 
right permits a defendant to refuse to answer questions “in any other 
proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might 
incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”185 However, the Supreme 
Court has held that parolees do not enjoy the same robust privilege. 
Parolees can be required to truthfully answer their parole officer’s 
questions as a condition of parole; and the refusal to answer, even if those 
answers would be incriminating, can subject the parolee to revocation.186 
Thus, although parolees have the theoretical right to refuse to answer a 
parole officer’s incriminating questions, exercising that right subjects the 
parolee to further imprisonment. Given that, as discussed in Part II.A, a 
parolee can be incarcerated upon revocation for a period that cumulatively 
exceeds the statutory maximum allowed for the crime that placed him on 
parole in the first place, parolees face a heavy price for exercising their 
right to remain silent.  
The one benefit of the right against self-incrimination that parolees 
retain is that their compelled statements cannot be used against them in a 
criminal trial. Thus, if a parolee makes incriminating statements to his 
parole officer and he can prove that those answers were compelled, then his 
responses cannot be used against him in a criminal trial. In order to 
demonstrate that his answers were compelled, however, the parolee must 
show that his parole officer “either expressly or by implication, assert[ed] 
that invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of [parole].”187 
The Court has interpreted this requirement very narrowly, and thus it is 
uncertain if a parole condition requiring a parolee to answer his parole 
officer’s questions truthfully would meet this burden.188 Furthermore, even 
if the answers are compelled, those statements are admissible in the parole 
 
 184. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 185. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 
 186. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984). 
 187. Id. at 435.  
 188. Id. at 436–38.  
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revocation hearing.189  
In sum, parolees who are compelled to make incriminating statements 
to their parole officers can have those statements used against them in a 
parole revocation hearing. Furthermore, if they refuse to answer their 
parole officers’ questions because their answers would incriminate them, 
then they are subject to revocation of parole because their refusal to 
truthfully answer questions posed by their parole officer is a violation of 
their conditions of parole. Thus, parolees can find themselves in an 
untenable position: either exercising their right or failing to exercise their 
right can lead to imprisonment. Although their compelled statements 
cannot be used against them in a criminal trial, parolees can still be 
imprisoned for a significant amount of time as a result of revocation. 
When it comes to the parolee’s rights to receive the warnings required 
by Miranda v. Arizona,190 the Supreme Court has held that the typical 
parole interview does not constitute “custody” despite the fact that parole 
officers “could compel [a parolee’s] attendance and truthful answers.”191 
This conclusion is justified because such seeming compulsion alone does 
not “transform[] a routine interview into an inherently coercive setting.”192 
Thus, these non-Mirandized statements can be used against the parolee in a 
criminal case as well as in parole revocation hearings.193  
In New York, statements taken in violation of Miranda are also 
admissible in parole revocation hearings.194 However, the failure of parole 
officers to inform a parolee of his Miranda rights may result in the 
statements being suppressed in a criminal case. For instance, when a 
parolee is represented by counsel in a criminal case, parole officers must 
inform the parolee of his Miranda rights prior to questioning him about the 
crime under indictment.195 Otherwise, any statements made to the parole 
 
 189. Id. at 435 n.7. See also Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc) 
(holding that revocation of supervised release based upon parolee’s refusal to answer questions relevant 
to his status did not violate the Fifth Amendment in part because the officer did not impair the parolee’s 
ability to invoke the privilege at any subsequent criminal proceeding). 
 190. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 191. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 431. 
 192. Id. 
 193. The Second Circuit has not addressed this question directly. The Fifth Circuit has held that 
when statements are taken outside of the routine interview context and in violation of Miranda, they are 
still admissible in parole revocation hearings because those hearings are administrative in nature. 
United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d 932, 933 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 194. See, e.g., People v. Ronald W., 249 N.E.2d 882, 883 (N.Y. 1969) (“[I]t is apparent that the 
probation officers were not required to give [the probationer] the Miranda warnings before 
[questioning] . . . .”). 
 195. People v. Parker, 442 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (App. Div. 1981). 
  
924 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:887 
officer are inadmissible in the criminal case.196 Furthermore, if a parolee is 
in custody, then Miranda warnings are required even if the parolee is not 
represented by a lawyer in order for the statements to be used against him 
in a criminal trial.197 However, when a parolee is neither in custody nor 
represented by counsel, New York courts are split on the question of 
whether parole officers must administer Miranda warnings in order for 
those statements to be admissible in a criminal case.198  
3.  The Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule 
The circuit courts are split on whether many Fourth Amendment rules 
apply to parolees. For instance, there is division over whether the Fourth 
Amendment’s oath and affirmation requirement applies to warrants issued 
in response to alleged violations of community supervision. In the Ninth 
Circuit, some violation warrants must be based on sworn facts,199 but the 
First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits do not require sworn facts for any violation 
of an arrest warrant200 and the Eleventh Circuit rejects the oath requirement 
for a violation summons.201 But one of the most central features of the 
Fourth Amendment—the availability of the exclusionary rule to remedy 
violations—was determined not to apply to parole revocation hearings by 
the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. 
Scott.202 The Court’s reasoning in Scott rests on assumptions about the 
operation of the parole revocation process that are inaccurate.  
To begin with, the Court concluded that police officers are likely to be 
unaware that the person searched is a parolee. Thus, because police officers 
would be deterred by their knowledge that the exclusionary rule applies in 
criminal trials, no additional deterrence was necessary.203 However, as we 
examine in detail in Part III, police and parole officers often conduct joint 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. People v. English, 534 N.E.2d 1195, 1195 (N.Y. 1989).  
 198. See, e.g., People v. Vann, 879 N.Y.S.2d 654, 658–60 (App. Div. 2009) (discussing split in 
the Appellate Divisions). 
 199. United States v. Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(e)(3)) (“After the period of supervised release has expired . . . the district court can revoke the 
term of supervised release only if a warrant based on sworn facts was issued within the supervised 
release period.”); United States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 200. United States v. Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d 516, 523 (1st Cir. 2011). See also United States v. 
Brennan, 285 F. App’x 51, 56 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (stating that a limited warrant was 
sufficient in the particular case); United States v. Garcia-Avalino, 444 F.3d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(same). These circuits reject the Ninth Circuit’s position, disavowing the requirement that a violation 
warrant, whether or not it extends the court’s jurisdiction, needs to be based on sworn facts.  
 201. United States v. Presley, 487 F.3d 1346, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 202. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998). 
 203. Id. at 367–68. 
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searches of parolees, so there is every reason to assume that police officers 
will be aware of an individual’s status, especially if the individual is a 
person of interest that the police have been investigating. Furthermore, we 
empirically establish in Part IV that in New York City police target 
parolee-dense neighborhoods, and not simply because parolees tend to live 
in high-crime neighborhoods. Thus our study brings into question the first 
factual prong of Scott’s justification for the inapplicability of the 
exclusionary rule in parole hearings. 
Targeting parolee-dense neighborhoods makes sense, since lower 
standards apply to searches of parolees. Parolees are easy targets for police 
street patrols. If illegally seized evidence is admissible in parole revocation 
hearings, police will have even stronger incentives to target parolees for 
searches. Furthermore, since lower standards apply for parole revocation 
proceedings than for initial criminal convictions, and parolees are subject to 
significant prison time as a result of such revocations, the benefits of police 
investigations of parolees are more certain than searches of others. All of 
these rules together give officers strong incentives to target parolees for 
searches.  
The second spurious factual justification that the Scott Court used was 
that deterring unlawful searches by parole officers was unnecessary 
because parole officers “are not engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime”204 and have a “more supervisory than adversarial” 
relationship with parolees.205 As will be discussed in Part III.A, while this 
may have been true at the advent of the parole system, a number of changes 
to parole since the 1970s make parole officers more like police officers.206 
Furthermore, the number of cases in which parole and police officers 
working together violate parolees’ Fourth Amendment rights belies this 
claim.207  
Additionally, proceeding with parole revocation “is often preferred to 
a new prosecution because of the procedural ease of recommitting the 
individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State.”208 Indeed, the 
exceptions to the ordinary criminal procedural protections described in this 
 
 204. Id. at 368 (quoting Untied States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984)).  
 205. Id. (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987)). 
 206. See infra note 232 and accompanying text discussing mission creep.  
 207. See, e.g., Scott, 524 U.S. at 374–375 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that parole officers are 
not “immune to [the] competitive zeal” of police officers); People v. Mackie, 430 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 
(App. Div. 1980) (citing cases) (finding that a parole officer “was merely a conduit for doing what the 
police could not do otherwise” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 208. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972). 
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section—significantly lowered burden of proof, relaxed evidentiary rules, 
and discretionary confrontation rights—provide many reasons to proceed 
by way of parole revocation instead of a criminal trial. In addition to all of 
these effects, failing to provide the exclusionary rule as a remedy for 
parolees at revocation hearings removes a potential deterrent to unlawful 
police and parole officer conduct.209 
When all of these various means of diluting parolees’ procedural 
rights during the parole revocation process are taken together, those 
proceedings begin to look more like traditional criminal trials, but without 
the protections ordinarily associated with such serious proceedings. 
Furthermore, since parolees can end up serving significant amounts of time 
in prison for parole revocations, even beyond the statutory maximum for 
the crime that led to them being placed on parole in the first place, a 
prosecutorial goal of seeing a parolee incarcerated for a significant amount 
of time may be better served by proceeding with a parole revocation 
hearing instead of a criminal trial.  
III.  PAROLE SUPERVISION AND ITS RESULTING 
VULNERABILITY  
The goal of parole is “to help individuals reintegrate into society as 
constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being confined 
for the full term of the sentence imposed.”210 However, as we demonstrate 
in this part, parole has instead become a system that not only hinders 
parolees’ successful reintegration but also makes them easy prey for those 
who would take advantage of their diminished status. These perverse 
effects are the result of a model of supervision that creates incentives to 
revoke parole, even when the parolee is not engaged in criminal conduct, 
and that strips parolees of procedural and constitutional protections, leaving 
them with little recourse against violations of the rights they do possess. 
Section A explains how the prevailing model of parole supervision can 
undermine rehabilitation. Using New York as a case study, Section B 
 
 209. Scholars and judges alike are divided on whether the exclusionary rule provides genuine 
protection in criminal trials. See Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 595 (2012) (explaining the failure of numerous empirical studies to answer 
this question). 
 210. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477. See also Caplan, supra note 3, at 33 (“The original intention of 
parole supervision was not to revoke parole, but to constantly assess the parolees’ progress and to make 
necessary changes.”); Angela D. West & Richard P. Seiter, Social Worker or Cop? Measuring the 
Supervision Style of Probation and Parole Officers in Kentucky and Missouri, J. CRIME & JUST., no. 2, 
2004, at 27, 29 (“Historically and almost exclusively until the late 1960s, probation and parole 
supervision was focused on restoring offenders to the community.”). 
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shows how police, criminals, and other community members are able to 
gain significant leverage over parolees due to parolee vulnerability to 
incarceration and an erosion of their constitutional and procedural rights. 
Such leverage undermines parolees’ reintegration prospects and erodes 
their rights even further. 
A.  PUNITIVE SURVEILLANCE  
Originally, the goal of community supervision was to give parolees 
the assistance they required to navigate their reentry into the community 
successfully. The intent was not to revoke supervision but to constantly re-
evaluate their progress and to make adjustments as necessary to facilitate 
their transition into the community.211 However, beginning in the 1970s 
and continuing to the present, this rehabilitative approach to parole has 
been replaced by a more surveillance-oriented model.212 Today, many 
jurisdictions have intensive supervision programs (“ISPs”),213 a model 
characterized by closer surveillance of parolees, with an emphasis on 
finding violations, revoking parole, and returning them to custody.214 The 
result is an increased number of revocations for minor technical violations, 
placing parolees at constant risk of incarceration because the sheer number 
of technical conditions makes it extremely difficult to avoid a violation.215 
Even law abiding citizens would have difficulty complying with all the 
 
 211. Caplan, supra note 3, at 33.  
 212. Id. at 34 (noting that the “social casework approach, which emphasizes assisting parolees 
with problems, counseling, and working to make sure they succeed,” has evolved and is now 
surveillance-oriented, “emphasiz[ing] law enforcement and the close monitoring of parolees to catch 
them if they fail and return them to prison”); James Bonta et al., Exploring the Black Box of Community 
Supervision, 47 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 248, 248 (2008) (studying 62 probation officers and 
finding that they “spent too much time on the enforcement aspect of supervision . . . and not enough 
time on the service delivery role of supervision”); Scott-Hayward, supra note 40, at 438 (“[A] 
surveillance or managerial model, dominated by a risk management philosophy has become more 
common among supervision agencies.”); David M. Stout, Home Sweet Home?! Maybe Not for Parolees 
and Probationers When It Comes to Fourth Amendment Protection, 95 KY. L.J. 811, 833 (2007) 
(“Though the system’s stated purpose is a goal of rehabilitation, ‘[the] parole services are almost 
entirely focused on control-oriented activities.’”); West & Seiter, supra note 210, at 29 (“Over the past 
two decades . . . the trend has been an increasing reliance on close surveillance . . . . This style places an 
emphasis on monitoring . . . compliance . . . and on the detection of violations leading to revocations 
and returns to custody.”). 
 213. Joan Petersilia, A Decade of Experimenting with Intermediate Sanctions: What Have We 
Learned?, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1998, at 3, 6. 
 214. West & Seiter, supra note 210, at 29. 
 215. Scott-Hayward, supra note 40, at 436 (“Given all the social, economic, and health deficits of 
those coming out of prison, it becomes less than surprising that so many parolees are sent back to prison 
for rule violations. When one combines these problems with conditions that are routinely set for 
parole . . . a recipe for failure results.” (quoting MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: HOW TO 
REDUCE CRIME AND END MASS INCARCERATION 150 (2005)).  
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conditions imposed upon parolees. For example, parolees face the risk of 
imprisonment for showing up late to or forgetting an appointment, or 
getting home late because of unanticipated difficulties, such as a bus failing 
to arrive, or deciding to spend the night at a girlfriend’s house instead of at 
home.216 Unsurprisingly, then, it is difficult for parolees to successfully 
complete community supervision without a single violation.217 
Four factors account for this change in supervision style. First, there 
has been a general rise in the punitiveness of the criminal justice system, 
with a focus on retribution instead of rehabilitation.218 Second, parole 
agencies worry that failing to revoke for minor violations would lead to 
criticism, scrutiny, and a lawsuit should the parolee commit a more serious 
crime later.219 Third, the exponential growth of community supervision 
agencies’ caseloads220 without a concomitant rise in resources also 
facilitates surveillance over rehabilitation.221 In New York, officers often 
have caseloads with at least 200 serious offenders.222 With caseloads this 
size, parole officers often lack sufficient time to engage in meaningful 
rehabilitative efforts, such as helping parolees find counseling services or 
employment.223 Even officers who might prefer a more individualized 
rehabilitation approach are “force[d] . . . to adopt more surveillance-type 
 
 216. These technical violations can result in revocation of parole. See, e.g., Bolden v. Dennison, 
814 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478 (App. Div. 2006) (finding that a parolee’s violation of his curfew constituted a 
violation of a substantial condition of his parole); Shaw v. Murray, 808 N.Y.S.2d 844, 844 (App. Div. 
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such conduct is proscribed by the conditions imposed by his parole.”). 
 217. For example, in a six-year study of fifteen youths in a Philadelphia neighborhood, only one 
person out of fifteen successfully completed parole. Goffman, supra note 117, at 345.  
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Surveillance Versus Treatment, 10 JUST. Q. 441, 443 (1993). A recent survey of parole officers in 
Manhattan and the Bronx found that 84 percent had excessive caseloads. SCOTT M. STRINGER, OFFICE 
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http://www.reentry.net/public2/library/attachment.92944. Furthermore, 87 percent of officers surveyed 
characterized their own caseloads as “too high.” Id. 
 223. West & Seiter, supra note 210, at 30.  
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activities to move offenders through the system.”224 Because of these 
institutional constraints, parole officers function more as police officers 
than social workers.225 In fact, these high caseloads can create incentives to 
revoke parolees for technical violations, since revocation means fewer 
cases.  
The final reason for the move to a more punitive approach is the 
growth of partnerships between parole agencies and the police.226 Parole-
police partnerships are being promoted by the Community Oriented 
Policing Services (“COPS”) of the U.S. Department of Justice.227 
According to COPS, key benefits of such partnerships include “intelligence 
and information sharing”228 and “joint efforts in the discovery of criminal 
activity.”229 These partnerships can also alleviate resource constraints 
within parole offices since the police can help monitor parolees.230 In 
jurisdictions that already have these partnerships, police and probation 
officers participate in joint ride-alongs and home searches.231  
However, these partnerships contribute to “mission creep,” whereby 
parole officers focus on law enforcement objectives over their counseling 
roles.232 As one police officer stated when asked to describe the benefits of 
 
 224. Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Caplan, supra note 3, at 35 (finding that 
although some officers think that rehabilitation functions are more effective, they use surveillance 
instead because of management pressure to address the concerns of a more punitive public as well the 
pressures of their caseloads).  
 225. Scott-Hayward, supra note 40, at 439 (“[P]arole officers look less like social workers and 
more like police officers.”). 
 226. West & Seiter, supra note 210, at 30. 
 227. See, e.g., JESSE JANNETTA & PAMELA LACHMAN, CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., 
PROMOTING PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN POLICE AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION: HOW COORDINATION 
CAN REDUCE CRIME AND IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY 3 (2011), available at http://ric-zai-
inc.com/Publications/cops-p203-pub.pdf (suggesting that supervision agencies can “enhance their role 
in improving public safety” by working with law enforcement). 
 228. Id. at 4. 
 229. Id. at 6. 
 230. Id. at 23. 
 231. Id. at 10–11. 
 232. Ronald P. Corbett, Jr., Probation Blue? The Promise (and Perils) of Probation-Police 
Partnerships, CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q., Summer 1998, at 31, 37–39 (noting that probation-police 
partnerships can lead to mission creep, mission distortion, and organizational lag); David Murphy, 
Police Probation Partnerships: Managing the Risks and Maximizing Benefits, JUST. POL’Y J., Spring 
2008, at 1, 17 (noting that as a result of police partnerships, “officers reported feeling that they were 
expected (by their law enforcement counterparts) to emphasize aggressive enforcement priorities at the 
expense of their service and mentoring obligations”). See also Clear & Latessa, supra note 222, at 444 
(“Most studies of roles in community supervision recognize two distinct functions: service delivery 
(assistance) and law enforcement (control or surveillance).”); Bitna Kim et al., Predictors of Law 
Enforcement Agencies’ Perceptions of Partnerships with Parole Agencies, 16 POLICE Q. 245, 249 
(2013) (“[P]robation officers would lose sight of their service responsibilities by working with police to 
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partnering with probation officers, “I think, just being able to access who 
their offenders are and [find out] what their restrictions are. And then 
having them as a tool to get into their houses that we wouldn’t otherwise be 
able to access for people.”233  
While reincarceration for new criminal offenses is to be expected, the 
more punitive approach that is currently in vogue creates a revolving door 
to prison even for technical violations, and that is problematic for a number 
of reasons. First, reincarceration can stymie any progress towards 
rehabilitation the parolee has already made. There is wide agreement that 
stable housing234 and strong social relationships235 are important to 
successful integration. Yet, arrests for technical violations can disrupt 
relationships with family and friends as well as cause parolees to lose jobs 
or educational opportunities, even if parolees are eventually reinstated to 
supervision. In this way, the surveillance model hinders rehabilitation by 
disrupting socialization back into the community. Second, arrests for 
technical violations also adversely affect the parolee-parole officer 
relationship, as parolees learn that parole officers are not there to help but 
rather to police them in order to return them to custody. If parolees feel 
constrained about sharing challenges they are experiencing with their 
 
conduct heightened supervision of probationers.”); Bitna Kim, Jurg Gerber & Dan Richard Beto, 
Listening to Law Enforcement Officers: The Promises and Problems of Police-Adult Probation 
Partnerships, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 625, 627 (2010) (“The partnerships may become a source of incentives 
for probation officers to gravitate toward a greater emphasis on the pursuit of law enforcement public 
safety priorities at the expense of their responsibilities to serve as mentors, service brokers, agency 
liaisons, and advocates for the offenders they supervise.”). 
 233. Murphy, supra note 232, at 18 (emphasis omitted). See also David Murphy & Faith Lutze, 
Police-Probation Partnerships: Professional Identity and the Sharing of Coercive Power, 37 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 65, 66 (2009) (noting that “if greater emphasis is placed on law enforcement objectives, [a] 
partnership will primarily serve the interests of the police” rather than probation officers). 
 234. JANNETTA & LACHMAN, supra note 227, at 6 (“[P]arolees are more likely to be successful if 
they can acquire stable housing and employment, abstain from drug and alcohol use, and engage in pro-
social activities . . . .”). See also DEMELZA BAER ET AL., URBAN INST., UNDERSTANDING THE 
CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY: RESEARCH FINDINGS FROM THE URBAN INSTITUTE’S PRISONER 
REENTRY PORTFOLIO 4, 8, 11, 13 (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/ 
411289_reentry_portfolio.pdf (concluding that stable housing is one of the most important components 
of successful reentry). 
 235. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PAROLE, DESISTANCE FROM CRIME, 
AND COMMUNITY INTEGRATION 21 (2007) (noting that the “association of marriage with lower crime 
among men has been widely reported in both quantitative and qualitative studies”); PETERSILIA, supra 
note 42, at 41 (“Reviews of prisoners’ family relationships yield two consistent findings: male prisoners 
who maintain strong family ties during imprisonment have higher rates of post-release success, and men 
who assume husband and parenting roles upon release have higher rates of success than those who do 
not.”); John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 
1, 13, 19–20 (2001) (noting that desistance from crime is influenced by a number of factors, the most 
important of which appear to be strong social bonds including marriage, family ties, and employment). 
  
2014] THE ATTRITION OF RIGHTS UNDER PAROLE 931 
officers, then officers will not obtain the information necessary to get 
parolees to treatment or to other programs that can aid in their reentry.  
These consequences of ISPs may well be worth the price parolees pay 
if it protects public safety by reducing recidivism. However, the evidence 
points to the contrary. One study found that although the surveillance 
model was effective in identifying parole violations, it did not reduce 
recidivism.236 Parole officers report that the rehabilitation model was more 
effective in providing assistance to parolees, while the surveillance 
approach simply helps officers catch parolees engaged in technical 
violations.237 Furthermore, a meta-analysis of existing studies found that 
“control-oriented programs—those seeking to deter offenders through 
surveillance and threats of punishment—were ineffective.”238 In fact, 
“[e]xcept in a few instances, there is no evidence that these programs are 
effective in reducing crime as measured by official record data.”239 Some 
parole scholars conclude that ISPs produce “equal to or higher rates of 
recidivism than regular probation or prison sentences.”240 Even some 
proponents of ISPs acknowledge that “technical violations [are] a weak 
predictor of future criminality.”241 Thus, while the control and surveillance 
model of supervision is likely significantly responsible for the high rates of 
revocation,242 “research repeatedly disproves that violating parolees for 
technicalities reduces new criminal arrests. In fact, new criminal arrests 
linked to former inmates constitute less than 3 percent of all arrests 
nationwide.”243  
Overall, the current supervision model increases the risk of 
reincarceration and hinders progress towards successful socialization.  
 
 236. Caplan, supra note 3, at 34. 
 237. Richard P. Seiter & Angela D. West, Supervision Styles in Probation and Parole: An 
Analysis of Activities, 38 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 57, 68–70, (2003). 
 238. Joan Petersilia, What Works in Prisoner Reentry? Reviewing and Questioning the Evidence, 
FED. PROBATION, Sept. 2004, at 4, 6 (“[I]ncreased monitoring in the community (e.g., intensive 
probation, electronic monitoring) did not alone reduce recidivism.”). See also Petersilia, supra note 213, 
at 6 (finding that while parolees are “watched more closely, . . . ISP supervision did not decrease 
subsequent arrests”). 
 239. Petersilia, supra note 213, at 6. See also West & Seiter, supra note 210, at 31 (citing a study 
finding that increasing surveillance may not reduce recidivism). 
 240. Benjamin Steiner, Treatment Retention: A Theory of Post-Release Supervision for the 
Substance Abusing Offender, FED. PROBATION, June 2004, at 24, 26. 
 241. Id.  
 242. West & Seiter, supra note 210, at 31. 
 243. Caplan, supra note 3, at 34 (citations omitted). 
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B.  LEVERAGE 
In this subpart, we examine the impact of the punitive nature of parole 
supervision, focusing in detail on New York City’s rules and their practical 
effects. Since our empirical analysis is of stop and frisk practices in New 
York City, a brief analysis of the rules of searches of parolees as applied in 
New York City is appropriate. We expect variance in police-parolee 
relations in different locations—for instance between cities and less 
populous areas; however, New York only partially takes advantage of the 
many means of leverage over parolees that we described in Parts I, II, and 
III.A. For instance, it does not allow entirely suspicionless searches, even 
though the U.S. Supreme Court has approved that practice. Parolees in 
New York in fact have more rights against unreasonable searches and 
seizures than parolees in other jurisdictions;244 yet we show that even so, 
there are still many points of leverage available against parolees in New 
York, which undermine the ultimate goals of parole. Thus, New York 
constitutes a good vehicle for examining the impact of parole 
jurisprudence. 
 
 244. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 2013) (“Before an inmate may be released on 
parole, he must agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure, without a search warrant, with or 
without cause, of the inmate’s person, any vehicle the inmate owns or is driving, and any of the 
inmate’s possessions by: (1) any probation agent employed by the Department of Probation, Parole and 
Pardon Services; or (2) any other law enforcement officer.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-301(1) (Supp. 
2013) (“An inmate who is eligible for release on parole shall, as a condition of parole, sign an 
agreement . . . that the inmate, while on parole, is subject to search or seizure of the inmate’s person, 
property, place of temporary or permanent residence, vehicle, or personal effects while on parole: (a) by 
a parole officer at any time, with or without a search warrant, and with or without cause; and (b) by a 
law enforcement officer at any time, with or without a search warrant, and with or without cause . . . .”); 
W. VA. CODE R. § 90-2-2(2.17) (2007) (“Parolees or probationers shall submit to a search without 
warrant of his or her person, place of residency or motor vehicle by his or her parole officer for 
supervision purposes at any time during the parole period.”). See also People v. McCullough, 6 P.3d 
774, 781 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (“[A] warrantless parole search is constitutional, even in the absence of 
‘reasonable grounds,’ if the search meets the following requirements: (1) it is conducted pursuant to any 
applicable statute; (2) it is conducted in furtherance of the purposes of parole, i.e., related to the 
rehabilitation and supervision of the parolee; and (3) it is not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.”); State 
v. Devore, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000) (quoting State v. Gawron, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 
(Idaho 1987)) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole 
officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement 
that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1043 (Ill. 2008) 
(quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006)) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit 
a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.”); Robinson v. State, 312 So. 2d 
15, 18 (Miss. 1975) (“[T]he parole authorities may subject [a parolee], his home and his effects, to 
inspection and search as may seem advisable to them.”); State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 696 A.2d 530, 540 
(N.H. 1997) (treating probation and parole as legally on par and concluding that warrantless probation 
searches are permissible if they further the purposes of probation); State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155, 
157 (Tenn. 2009) (“[P]arolees who are subject to a warrantless search condition may be searched 
without reasonable or individualized suspicion.”). 
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1.  Reduced Fourth Amendment Rights  
Parolees in New York have a right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.245 Importantly, however, in determining 
reasonableness, the individual’s status as a parolee is a relevant 
consideration, and may in fact be determinative.246 Courts will “weigh the 
interference . . . entail[ed] against the precipitating and attending 
conditions, including a parolees’ diminished privacy expectations and the 
conditional nature of parolees’ liberty.”247 As New York courts repeatedly 
emphasize, “what may be unreasonable with respect to an individual who is 
not on parole may be reasonable with respect to one who is.”248 Such a 
position may be entirely reasonable, but we show that in combination with 
other punitive parole conditions, such rules become counter-productive. 
Parolees give consent to searches of their residence, person, and 
property as a standard condition of release,249 although this consent only 
applies to searches that are rationally and reasonably related to the duties of 
the parole officer,250 which the burden is on the state to show.251 
Furthermore, a parolee’s joint occupants who have equal authority to 
control access to shared residences can consent to searches of jointly 
occupied areas.252 
Stops and frisks as well as searches conducted by a parolee’s own 
parole officer are reasonable if the search is “rationally and reasonably 
related to the performance of the parole officer’s duty,” including the 
 
 245. People v. Huntley, 371 N.E.2d 794, 796 (N.Y. 1977). 
 246. Id. at 797.  
 247. People v. Porter, 952 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681 (App. Div. 2012) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 248. Id. (quoting People v. Burry, 859 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (App. Div. 2008)). See also U.S. ex rel. 
Santos v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216, 1218 (2d Cir. 1971) (“A search which would be 
unlawful if directed against an ordinary citizen may be proper if conducted against a parolee.”). 
 249. A parolee signs a consent form upon release which mandates that the parolee “will permit the 
search and inspection of his person, residence and property.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, 
§ 8003.2(d) (2011). 
 250. Huntley, 371 N.E.2d at 796; People v. Tony, 914 N.Y.S.2d 585, 592 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 251. Tony, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 592. See also People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 580 (N.Y. 1976) 
(holding that consent must be voluntary and free from implicit or express coercion). 
 252. People v. Cosme, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (N.Y. 1979); People v. Miller, 572 N.Y.S.2d 149, 
150–51 (App. Div. 1991); People v. Buggs, 528 N.Y.S.2d 659, 660 (App. Div. 1988). See also People 
v. Lownes, 837 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368–69 (App. Div. 2007) (finding that a girlfriend living with a parolee 
may also give consent to search their residence); People v. Carrington, 807 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90 (App. Div. 
2006) (same); People v. Adams, 665 N.Y.S.2d 991, 992–93 (App. Div. 1997) (citing United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169 (1974)) (finding that a search of a parolee’s bedroom in his father’s house 
was reasonable based upon the father’s consent when the father was a “joint occupant” and the space 
searched was “jointly occupied”). 
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officer’s duties to reintegrate the parolee into society, prevent parole 
violations, and detect and prevent crimes.253 New York police officers do 
not have the same latitude: searches by police officers must meet the 
traditional standards of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, as the case 
may be, although the parolee’s status is relevant to the reasonableness 
determination.254 We show below that the reality can be more permissive 
than is required by law.  
Additionally, if a police officer is working with parole officers, the 
standard for stopping and frisking a parolee is even lower than the 
reasonable suspicion standard. When working together, the more 
permissive parole officer standard applies as long as the parole officer is 
investigating a parole violation.255 Even when the parole officer is not 
present, a police officer acting under the “fellow officer rule” may frisk a 
parolee without reasonable suspicion if a parole officer directs the police 
officer to do so and the purpose of the frisk is “rationally and reasonably” 
related to the parole officer’s duty.256 
As a result of the greater latitude parole officers have to conduct 
searches, courts will carefully scrutinize the parole officer’s role in 
searches involving both parole and police officers.257 In joint searches, if 
parole officers are simply acting as agents of the police, the search is 
unreasonable unless probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists.258 But 
 
 253. Huntley, 371 N.E.2d at 797. See also People v. Driscoll, 957 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (App. Div. 
2012) (addressing stops and frisks); People v. LaFontant, 847 N.Y.S.2d 650, 651 (App. Div. 2007) 
(holding that a search of a parolee’s cell phone by a parole officer was unreasonable because it was not 
rationally and reasonably related to the parole officer’s duties). 
 254. People v. Carney, 444 N.E.2d 26, 27 (N.Y. 1982) (stating that officer must have knowledge 
of some fact or circumstance that suggests the suspect is armed or poses a threat to safety for 
authorization to frisk); People v. Caicedo, 893 N.Y.S.2d 609, 609 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting People v. 
Batista, 672 N.E.2d 581, 583 (N.Y. 1996)) (holding that to conduct a protective pat frisk, an officer 
“must have knowledge of some fact or circumstance that supports a reasonable suspicion that the 
suspect is armed or poses a threat to safety”). 
 255. Carrington, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 90 (“Although the parole officers were cooperating with the 
police, who were investigating a homicide, the record fails to support defendant’s assertion that the 
parole officers were acting solely on behalf of the police.”). 
 256. People v. Porter, 952 N.Y.S.2d 678, 682 (App. Div. 2012) (holding that a parole officer 
directing police to search was reasonable after receiving a confidential informant tip that a parolee was 
carrying a gun and was out past his curfew). But see Driscoll, 957 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (stating that a police 
officer frisk of a parolee was unsupported by reasonable suspicion). 
 257. People v. Peterson, 777 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (App. Div. 2004); People v. Felder, 708 N.Y.S.2d 
774, 775 (App. Div. 2000); People v. Candelaria, 406 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786 (App. Div. 1978). 
 258. Candelaria, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 786. See also Huntley, 371 N.E.2d at 797 (holding that looking 
for evidence for not reporting to a meeting when a parolee did not appear unable to leave his home was 
reasonable); People v. Lloyd, 951 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (App. Div. 2012) (holding that looking for a 
parolee whose ankle bracelet had stopped transmitting a signal was reasonable); People v. Johnson, 942 
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otherwise the search will be reasonable, even if police are present, as long 
as the search is rationally and reasonably related to the parole officer’s 
duties.259  
For instance, in People v. Taylor, police suspected Taylor, a parolee, 
of involvement in a robbery.260 The officers called Taylor’s parole officer 
in order to obtain his address. However, they did not disclose their 
suspicions.261 During their conversation, the parole officer informed the 
police that he was going to Taylor’s residence to check compliance with a 
10 p.m. curfew and asked the officers to accompany him.262 Upon finding 
that Taylor was not at home, it was clear that Taylor was in violation of his 
mandated curfew. As a result, the parole officer conducted a search of the 
residence in order to find information about his whereabouts. During the 
search, Taylor called and made incriminating statements. At his subsequent 
trial on robbery charges, Taylor sought to have his statements suppressed 
as the fruit of an unlawful search.263 He argued that the “police officers 
illegally and improperly bypassed the requirement of obtaining a valid 
search warrant by masking the visit [to his] residence and search of his 
room as a parole visit.”264 The court held that his statements were 
admissible because the initial trip to Taylor’s residence was to “pursu[e] 
parole-related objectives,” and although police officers were present, the 
search was reasonably and rationally related to the parole officer’s 
duties.265  
Although parolees have a right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures, whether the exclusionary rule applies to parole revocation 
proceedings in New York is an open question. In People ex rel. Piccarillo 
v. New York State Board of Parole,266 the New York Court of Appeals held 
that the exclusionary remedy applies to all illegally obtained evidence 
during the parole revocation process. However, subsequent to that decision, 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania Board of Probation & 
 
N.Y.S.2d 738 (App. Div. 2012) (holding that unlocking and searching a parolee’s car and finding 
contraband in the console was reasonable when independently justified by a parole officer). 
 259. Carrington, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 89 (“Although the parole officers were cooperating with the 
police, who were investigating a homicide, the record fails to support defendant’s assertion that the 
parole officers were acting solely on behalf of the police.”); People v. Lopez, 733 N.Y.S.2d 154, 154 
(App. Div. 2001); Felder, 708 N.Y.S.2d at 775. 
 260. People v. Taylor, 947 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (App. Div. 2012). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 872–73. 
 263. Id. at 873. 
 264. Id. at 872 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 265. Id. at 873. 
 266. People ex rel. Piccarillo v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 397 N.E.2d 354, 358 (N.Y. 1979). 
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Parole v. Scott, which held that the exclusionary rule was not 
constitutionally mandated in parole hearings.267 Since Scott, the lower New 
York courts are split on the issue of whether Piccarillo is still good law. At 
least two trial courts have interpreted Piccarillo to hold that the 
exclusionary rule in parole revocation hearings is a state constitutional right 
and thus is still applicable post-Scott.268 However, at least one trial court 
has held that Piccarillo did not create a right to the exclusionary rule under 
the state constitution.269  
Even if the exclusionary rule does apply, it is well established that 
there are many ways around that constraint.270 Illegally garnered evidence 
can nonetheless be used to prosecute third parties who lack standing to 
exclude, to impeach a defendant’s or witness’s credibility, to prosecute 
noncriminal cases, to find other evidence,271 to recover contraband, to 
harass a suspect, or to induce a subject to become a police informant.272 
This is even more strongly the case for searches of parolees because parole 
revocation hearings are administrative proceedings273 and administrative 
hearing officers have no authority to rule on constitutional issues.274 Thus, 
unless there has been a “prior judicial determination that evidence 
presented at a preliminary parole revocation hearing has been illegally 
obtained, a Hearing Officer may consider that evidence on the issue of 
probable cause.”275 Additionally, a “subsequent judicial determination 
 
 267. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998). 
 268. People ex rel. Taylor v. Warden, No. 260531-2011, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6165, at *6 
(Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 2011) (unpublished decision); State ex rel. Thompson v. Harder, 799 N.Y.S.2d 353, 
355 n.2 (Sup. Ct. 2005).  
 269. People ex rel. Gordon v. O’Flynn, 775 N.Y.S.2d 507, 513–14 (Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 270. See Jacobi, supra note 209, at 597 (describing the manifold benefits of conducting searches 
even if the results of those searches are excluded at trial). 
 271. Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 
665, 734–35 (1970). 
 272. Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1365, 1370–71 (2008). 
 273. People ex rel. Maiello v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 480 N.E.2d 356, 357 (N.Y. 1985); People 
ex rel. Piccarillo v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 397 N.E.2d 354, 356 (N.Y. 1979).  
 274. People ex rel. Zeigler v. Warden, 562 N.Y.S.2d 677, 678 (App. Div. 1990) (“[T]he proper 
forum for petitioner to challenge seizure of the physical evidence was in a suppression court, rather than 
before the Division of Parole.”); Tejada v. Christian, 422 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (App. Div. 1979) (holding 
that a housing authority hearing officer correctly ruled that he had no authority to rule on a 
constitutional issue related to allegations of an illegal search and seizure). 
 275. People ex rel. Victory v. Travis, 734 N.Y.S.2d 749, 751 (App. Div. 2001). However, a 
parolee must be given the opportunity to litigate suppression issues. Id. If the parolee does not have a 
pending criminal case, he or she can bring a habeas corpus proceeding for a determination of whether 
evidence was illegally seized. People ex rel. Coldwell v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 506 N.Y.S.2d 761, 
763 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that a lower court erred in failing to hold a hearing on a parolee’s habeas 
proceeding made during the pendency of his preliminary hearing). If the parolee has a pending criminal 
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suppressing that evidence does not undermine the validity of the probable 
cause determination” because “evidence that has not been suppressed may 
supply the basis for a probable cause determination at a preliminary parole 
revocation hearing.”276 Once probable cause is found, the parolee must 
remain in custody pending his final revocation hearing. 
2.  Vulnerability to Manipulation  
The ease with which parolees can lose their conditional freedom and 
the minimal procedural and substantive protections available to them gives 
others considerable leverage over them. A phone call to a parole officer 
reporting that a parolee has violated his curfew or was drinking alcohol in 
his home can be sufficient reason for parole officers to conduct a 
warrantless search of the parolee’s home without probable cause or to 
conduct a stop and frisk on the street without reasonable suspicion.  
Police may even be asked to accompany the parole officer’s search, in 
which case the lower standard also covers their actions. NYPD officers 
sometimes use partnerships with parole officers to essentially commandeer 
joint home searches.277 The cover of parole officers’ broader search 
entitlements is exploited by police to conduct otherwise illegal searches, 
harass parolees, and expand searches beyond the parolee and areas within 
his control,278 a practice known as the “stalking horse.”279 While New York 
state courts have suppressed evidence in criminal prosecutions as a result of 
these types of searches,280 the Second Circuit has rejected “stalking horse” 
challenges to joint searches conducted without a warrant.281  
 
case based on the same facts underlying the alleged parole violation, he or she can ask for an 
adjournment of the parole hearing in order to litigate the suppression issue there. Glenn v. O’Meara, 
No. 139429, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5832, at *9 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 2012) (unpublished decision) 
(“Where a criminal action is pending with respect to the same conduct underlying the parole revocation 
proceedings, suppression issues can be addressed in criminal court.”). 
 276. Travis, 734 N.Y.S.2d at 751. 
 277. Kit R. Roane, Use of Police in Parole Raids Stirs Praise, but Also Concern, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 12, 1999, at A1. 
 278. Id. 
 279. William D. Burrell, Getting the Most Out of Probation/Parole-Police Partnerships, 
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS REP., Nov./Dec. 1999, at 1, 2.  
 280. See, e.g., People v. Mackie, 430 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (App. Div. 1980) (finding that “[t]here 
was no satisfactory explanation for [the] presence” of police officers during a parole officer’s visit to a 
parolee’s apartment). 
 281. In the Second Circuit, it is irrelevant whether police officers are “using” parole officers’ 
broader search entitlements simply to gather criminal evidence. United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 
463 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that when a probation officer enters a residence based upon information 
that the parolee is engaged in illegal activity, “it is difficult to imagine a situation where [he]  . . . would 
not be pursuing legitimate supervised release objectives,” even if accompanied by the police). The same 
rule applies to state parole officers. United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 667 (2d Cir. 2004). Thus, 
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There is reason to believe that the lower standard will be applied in 
New York with some frequency because the NYPD and the New York 
Division of Parole participate in joint task forces to locate and arrest people 
who have absconded from parole.282 Additionally, the Parole Division has a 
policy requiring their officers to be accompanied by at least two police 
officers for any home visit occurring after 10 p.m.283 Police and parole 
agencies also contribute to and share a criminal justice database284 and 
participate in joint ride-alongs.285 More informally, case law references 
police and parole officer cooperation even in the absence of an official 
policy or partnership.286  
Additionally, officers can use the threat of arrest to coerce parolees 
into acting as informants. Acting as a criminal informant is not only 
dangerous—it also places parolees in contact with criminals, thereby 
increasing their risk of reoffending.287 Furthermore, being in proximity to 
known criminals can violate a condition of their parole. Yet, this double 
bind may be difficult for parolees to avoid. 
In addition to enabling police and parole officer intrusions on 
parolees’ privacy, these reduced rights against the state also make parolees 
vulnerable to victimization by private individuals, who can prey on their 
diminished legal status. For instance, a mugger with awareness that a 
parolee is out past curfew can easily rob him, knowing that the parolee is 
unlikely to report the incident to his parole officer or the police.288 
Additionally, gang members and other criminals can blackmail parolees 
into criminal activity by threatening to call their parole officer or the police 
with a tip, whether true or not, that the parolee is engaged in criminal 
activity or violating some other condition of parole.  
 
there is every incentive for the police to conduct searches with parole officers in order to avoid the 
probable cause, warrant, and reasonable suspicion requirements. 
 282. See, e.g., People v. Van Buren, 604 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189 (App. Div. 1993) (referencing NYPD 
officer assigned to the Warrant Division of the Parole Task Force); People v. Fields, 756 N.Y.S.2d 399, 
401 n.1 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (referencing a joint task force between the NYPD and the New York Division 
of Parole). 
 283. People v. Taylor, 947 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (App. Div. 2012) (referencing this policy). 
 284. JANNETTA & LACHMAN, supra note 227, at 25. 
 285. Interview by David M. Allen with Mary Kopp, Parole Officer, N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & 
Supervision (July 10, 2013). 
 286. State v. Harder, 799 N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 n.2 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (referencing police and parole 
officers conducting a joint operation). 
 287. JANNETTA & LACHMAN, supra note 227, at 27 (noting that while “[p]olice may 
want . . . parolees to aid their investigative work by acting as criminal informants,” doing so “could 
require interacting with criminals and might ultimately put supervisees at risk for reoffending”).  
 288. Goffman, supra note 117, at 345 (describing an incident in which a parolee feared going to 
the hospital after being severely beaten). 
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Studies have shown that even family and friends use parolee status as 
a form of leverage over the parolee. Sociologist Alice Goffman, who 
conducted a six-year study of a group of African American men in a 
Philadelphia neighborhood, found that friends and family would often use 
the threat of reporting real or false violations to parole officers as a means 
of coercion and social control.289 In fact, one parole officer related that “the 
most common way he learned about rule violations was from offenders’ 
‘girlfriends, ex-girlfriends, family, [or] friends.’”290 This, of course, 
undermines the very social networks that are critical to rehabilitation. 
The point of this discussion is not that members of the community 
should be discouraged from reporting parolees’ violations of conditions; 
rather, it is that the punitive nature of the parole system makes parolees so 
attuned to the threat of revocation that it can make them vulnerable to 
manipulation in ways that undermine their prospects for rehabilitation. 
Police and criminals alike can use parole violations, real or fictitious, as 
leverage to coerce parolees into acting as informants or engaging in 
criminal activities, since, once a parolee is arrested on a violation, he or she 
will remain in custody for at least fifteen and up to 105 days before a 
hearing officer will adjudicate the merits of the alleged violation.  
Even if the parolee is eventually restored to supervision, any job or 
educational opportunities he or she had will likely have been lost while he 
or she languished in jail. We have illustrated this effect by examining New 
York, a state that does not even fully exploit the latitude given to it by the 
Supreme Court. “[T]he threat of imprisonment transforms social relations 
by undermining already tenuous attachments to family, work, and 
community[,]” and it allows people in the community to “exploit 
[parolees’] wanted status as an instrument of social control.”291 In this way, 
parolees’ reduced rights breed even fewer rights. For all of these reasons, 
the current system of parole, which is meant to facilitate a parolee’s 
successful reentry into the community, has the perverse effect of achieving 
the opposite. 
3.  Targeting Parolees for Stops and Frisks  
Police officers have more latitude to stop and frisk parolees than 
ordinary citizens because a parolee’s status is relevant to the 
reasonableness determination. This suggests that officers will subject 
 
 289. Id. at 348–49.  
 290. Klingele, supra note 46, at 1037 n.111. 
 291. Goffman, supra note 117, at 339.  
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parolees to more aggressive policing tactics. Typically, officers’ 
performance evaluations and promotions are tied to the number of arrests 
they make.292 To the extent that rank and file officers want to move up the 
chain of command, this merit system provides them with incentives to 
focus stops and frisks in neighborhoods where they believe they will 
achieve the greatest number of arrests at the lowest cost.293 This makes 
neighborhoods with high concentrations of parolees extremely attractive.  
More permissive reasonableness standards governing police 
interactions with parolees make it easier to justify stops and frisks. For 
instance, parolees tend to live in high-crime neighborhoods, a factor 
officers often utilize to explain why they considered an individual’s 
otherwise innocent behavior suspicious.294 While courts have sometimes 
rejected this as the sole basis for stopping and frisking ordinary citizens, it 
may be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion if parolees are the 
targets, given their diminished expectations of privacy.295 This reasoning 
similarly applies to other criteria officers rely on to justify their stops and 
frisks, such as a suspect’s association with known criminals. As such, not 
only might the threshold for searching parolees be lower than for ordinary 
citizens, but also establishing reasonableness is easier for the police when 
the frisk concerns parolees. 
Parolees often live in neighborhoods with large concentrations of 
 
 292. See, e.g., The War on Marijuana in Black and White, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION 98–104 
(June 2013), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/061413-mj-report-rfs-rel5.pdf (noting the use of arrests as 
performance measures and incentives to obtain federal grants). This form of accountability is largely an 
outgrowth of Compstat, a program developed in New York that allows departments to gather crime 
statistics in order to “identify emerging problems[,] to coordinate effective deployment of resources 
[, and] to increase accountability.” Compstat: Its Origins, Evolution, and Future in Law Enforcement 
Agencies, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE 4, 8 (2013), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PERF-
Compstat.pdf. As Wesley Skogan notes, Compstat “focuses on traditional measures” of performance, 
including the number of arrests made. Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, in POLICE REFORM FROM 
THE BOTTOM UP: OFFICERS AND THEIR UNIONS AS AGENTS OF CHANGE 144, 151 (Monique Marks & 
David Sklansky eds., 2012). 
 293. JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE 
OF FORCE 189–190 (1993) (“[O]bjectification and quantification of police work . . . trickles down to the 
department’s lowest level, its patrol cars and foot beats. When that occurs, everybody up and down the 
line becomes driven by the need to generate what New York cops used to call ‘big numbers.’”).  
 294. See infra Part IV. 
 295. See, e.g., People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 570 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that acts were 
sufficient to justify officers’ suspicions in part because it was late at night in a high-crime area); People 
v. Howard, 542 N.Y.S.2d 536, 540 (App. Div. 1989) (noting that the high-crime factor alone “cannot 
serve as the justification for untoward or excessive police behavior,” but that it can be considered “in 
combination with objective factors specific to the incident which together support a founded suspicion 
that some particular criminal activity may be afoot”); People v. Cornelius, 497 N.Y.S.2d 16, 19 (App. 
Div. 1986) (noting the high-crime nature of the area in determining that a stop and frisk was justified). 
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convicts and criminals,296 making it even easier for officers to stop and 
frisk parolees. Because open-air drug markets and gang violence are often 
rampant in such neighborhoods, it is easy for a parolee to inadvertently be 
in the vicinity of a drug deal or violence. Thus, simply walking around their 
own neighborhood may give officers reason to stop parolees for 
questioning. Even if parolees make efforts to avoid criminals and other 
parolees in their midst, these efforts may themselves be used as evidence of 
suspicious activity justifying a stop: walking down deserted streets, looking 
around before entering a building, and remaining in a vehicle until 
ascertaining the coast is clear are all behaviors cited by NYPD officers as 
suspicious activity warranting a stop and frisk.297  
Moreover, a standard condition of parole in New York and many other 
states prohibits parolees from associating with anyone who has a criminal 
record. Officers are likely aware of this condition as a result of working 
closely with parole officers. Hence, parolees are constantly at risk of 
violating or being accused of violating this condition of parole simply by 
virtue of where they live. Police can not only use this parole condition as a 
basis for stopping and questioning a parolee, but also they can threaten to 
make a phone call to the parole officer to report a suspected violation. This 
can then provide the basis for the issuance of a parole warrant. 
Another factor that may result in parolees being stopped and frisked 
more often than ordinary citizens is that being a person with “dangerous 
propensities” can be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.298 Officers 
have multiple ways of becoming aware of a parolee’s criminal history.299 If 
officers know that a parolee was previously convicted of an assault or some 
other violent offense, this can support an inference that he or she poses a 
 
 296. See infra Part IV, Maps A–D (showing the strong coincidence between parolee-dense 
neighborhoods and police stops).  
 297. Howard, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 536–40 (noting that officers approached individual for more 
investigation when, among other things, they observed the individual standing on a street corner near a 
subway entrance for two to three minutes, looking up and down the street and subway stairs); 
Cornelius, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 17–20 (noting that officers justified a stop in part because they saw the 
defendant walking, stopping, and looking around at 10 p.m. wearing a “ragged and old” trench coat); 
People v. Williams, 436 N.Y.S.2d 15, 17 (App. Div. 1981) (discussing an anticrime unit whose officers 
decided “to check their license and registration, things like that” after observing three men talking to 
each other in a vehicle for about fifteen minutes while looking at the front door of a building). 
 298. People v. Chinchillo, 509 N.Y.S.2d 153, 155 (App. Div. 1986) (discussing “dangerous 
propensities attributable to [defendant]” as part of reasonableness analysis). 
 299. In New York, police and parole agencies both contribute to and share a criminal justice 
database. JANNETTA & LACHMAN, supra note 227, at 25. See also supra note 282 and accompanying 
text (discussing joint task forces). Additionally, police officers can become aware of the parolee’s 
criminal history through the joint parole-police task forces and through their previous interactions with 
parolees. 
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danger to officer safety and should be frisked.  
Officers may also use aggressive stops and frisks in areas with large 
numbers of parolees in order to drive them out of the neighborhood.300 
Parolees have little recourse against such activities. While they could in 
theory bring a civil rights damages action pursuant to § 1983 in Title 42 of 
the United States Code, these claims provide little hope for relief because 
of qualified immunity and a host of other problems.301 Additionally, 
parolees who are harassed by the police have much to lose if they complain 
or report the misconduct because if they are arrested in retaliation, they can 
spend a considerable amount of time in custody before a final revocation 
hearing is held.  
In sum, parolees make attractive targets for police officers motivated 
to bolster their arrest statistics. Since parolees have only limited rights 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, police may err on the side of 
conducting a frisk or search rather than forego the opportunity to find 
criminal evidence. Furthermore, as we showed in previous sections, a 
parolee’s reduced procedural and substantive rights mean that officers can 
violate the few privacy protections parolees do possess with impunity. 
Even if police conduct an unlawful search or seizure, illegally seized 
evidence can be considered in determining whether the parolee violated 
any condition of parole. Thus, the myriad conditions to which parolees are 
subject, coupled with their reduced procedural and substantive rights, have 
the effect of decreasing their rights even further. The next part tests 
whether these effects occur systematically. 
IV.  AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF PAROLE ON THE 
INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY: NEW YORK CITY POLICE 
STOPS, FRISKS, SEARCHES, AND ARRESTS 
This part reports our empirical study of the relationship between living 
in a neighborhood with a high density of parolees and the frequency of both 
police stops and police action taken after stopping an individual—
conducting frisks, searches, and arrests. We show that not only are 
individual parolees subject to significantly more stops, searches, and 
 
 300. Kim, Gerber & Beto, supra note 232, at 631 (noting that “mission distortion” caused by 
partnerships can “make it easier for police to abuse their power and engage in behaviors such as 
harassing probationers in an attempt to drive them out of particular neighborhoods”). 
 301. For a general discussion of the barriers posed by § 1983 litigation, see Barbara E. Armacost, 
Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 467 (2004) and Dasha 
Kabakova, Note, The Lack of Accountability for the New York Police Department’s Investigative Stops, 
10 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 539, 551–55 (2012).  
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arrests, but so are nonparolees living in neighborhoods with high numbers 
of parolees. This hazard is not simply a product of being a high-crime area; 
if that were the case, we would see increases in all four categories of 
outcomes. The reduced rights of parolees created by Samson and other like 
rules enable police to search parolees with lower standards of suspicion; 
consequently, they can often undertake searches without first using frisks to 
establish probable cause for a search. Consistent with this, our results show 
that frisks are significantly decreased in parolee-dense neighborhoods, 
while stops, searches, and arrests are significantly increased. 
A.  ORIGINAL DATA DESCRIPTION  
In order to analyze the effect of parole on both individual and 
community constitutional criminal rights, we created two new databases: 
one that examines the effect of parole on the probability of being stopped 
by the police, and another that examines the effect of parole on the 
probability, once stopped, of being frisked, searched, and arrested.  
Both of our databases use New York City police statistics. New York 
City was recently found liable in the first of three class actions challenging 
the constitutionality of the nonrandom nature of police stops, frisks, 
searches, and arrests. The order was subsequently blocked, and the legal 
case was settled, with an agreement that a court-appointed monitor would 
oversee reform of the NYPD’s stop and frisk program. Our analysis adds 
insight to that controversy. That litigation concerned racial profiling, but 
our analysis shows that, even controlling for race at both the individual and 
the community levels, police targeting of individuals for Terry stops is 
correlated with the density of the parolee population. Racial differences are 
only one mechanism by which police are selecting individuals for stops; 
parole is another such targeting factor. Consequently, our data confirms the 
suspicion raised by our preceding doctrinal analysis that parole 
jurisprudence has had a significant adverse effect on individual and 
community rights. 
Our database concerning the probability of being frisked, searched, 
and arrested uses data from previous racial profiling studies and expands on 
it to include parolee density statistics. This database is rich in information, 
comprising over 678,000 observations of police stops of individuals in 
2011. The Appendix provides a copy of the form the NYPD used to collate 
the data. The data has over 100 variables, including: the sex, race, and age 
of the individual stopped by the police; the location where the stop 
occurred; and information about the nature of the stop. The data includes 
the reason why a stop was initiated, the procedure followed during the stop 
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(such as whether force was used), and the outcome of the stop (such as 
what was found during a search). Consequently, we are able to consider 
and control for a large number of factors that could potentially affect the 
relationship between police stops and parolee density. 
One limitation of this frisk, search, and arrest data is that it selects on 
the dependent variable—it shows only what happens when a stop occurs. 
As such, it is possible to examine the race, gender, and income of only 
those stopped. Thus, this data cannot answer the preliminary question of 
why any person is stopped in the first place, since it has no information on 
who is not stopped. However, our second database provides an opportunity 
to address this question. We have combined data about New York City 
police stops per zip code302 and the number of parolees per zip code,303 
allowing us to analyze the relationship between the two. Thus, in 
combination, our two databases allow us to analyze who is stopped and 
what happens once they are stopped.  
There were two practical complications in creating these databases—
one geographic and one temporal. The raw parolee data was at the zip code 
level, whereas the raw stop data was at the individual level. Nonetheless, 
we were able to translate the data into comparable geographic units. The 
stop data contains X and Y coordinates under the State Plane Coordinate 
System, which is akin but not identical to the latitude and longitude 
coordinate system. Next, we converted the parolee data available at the zip 
code level into the State Plane System.304 We then performed a Spatial Join 
to convert both sets of data into zip codes.305 This allowed us to answer our 
preliminary question of who is stopped by comparing police stop data with 
parolee data.  
The temporal complication was that the parolee data is the number of 
parolees living in a zip code as of December 15, 2008, whereas the police 
 
 302. Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-
frisk-data (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
 303. Data, JUST. ATLAS SENT’G & CORRECTIONS, http://www.justiceatlas.org (last visited Mar. 
14, 2014). 
 304. It was originally in a projected Coordinate System called NAD_1983_UTM_Zone_18N. We 
converted the projection of the zip codes into the State Plane coordinate system using the Projection 
tool in ArcGIS 10. We very gratefully acknowledge the invaluable aid of David Chan for his help in 
automating and executing this conversion process.  
 305. A Spatial Join uses a common key between the two sets of information to combine them; the 
“key” is based on a spatial location where the points fall within the zip code. To see an example, visit 
http://i.imgur.com/t1f4fqu.jpg. Basically, the spatial join pulls the information from the zip code 
outlines into each of the stop and frisk points. Again, thanks to David Chan for writing a program that 
automated this process, and thus making it practical to undertake for 600,000 observations. 
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stop, frisk, search, and arrest data is for the year 2011. There are a number 
of reasons to be reassured that our results are valid despite this time 
difference. First, empirically, as becomes apparent in the discussion of 
Figure 3 below, there is a high level of congregation of where parolees live, 
and so there is good reason to expect that the parolee data would not 
change drastically from year to year. Second, theoretically, it makes good 
sense to compare parolee data from at least a slightly earlier date than the 
stop data, since police officers’ impressions of the demographic 
characteristics of a neighborhood would presumably be based on how that 
neighborhood was in the recent past, rather than how the neighborhood is at 
that precise moment. Even if parolee density data does change, police 
perceptions are likely to lag, so our results should be reliable despite the 
time shift. Finally, to the extent that there is more of a lag in our data than 
in the police targeting process, this complication should make finding any 
result more difficult, and so it does not undermine our results. 
We first address the preliminary question of who is stopped, using 
what we call the “Stop Data.” We then address the secondary question of 
what occurs after the stop is made, using what we call the “Frisk, Search, 
and Arrest Data.”  
1.  Descriptive Statistics: Stop Data 
Table 1 provides a summary of our first database, the Stop Data. The 
first two variables, “parolees” and “stops,” are the rates of parolees and the 
rates of stops for each zip code. We hypothesize that parolee density and 
stop frequency will be positively related—our theory is that police target 
high parolee neighborhoods for Terry stops.  
It is apparent from the summary information that the incidence of both 
parolees and police stops varies considerably between zip codes—the 
standard deviation for each is greater than their respective means. For all of 
the variables, the minimum is zero. Perhaps unsurprisingly, some zip codes 
in the city have no resident parolees, and some have no incidence of police 
stops. The zip code with the highest density had 540 parolees, and the most 
targeted zip code had tens of thousands of stops. Clearly neither variable is 
distributed randomly.  
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TABLE 1.  Stop Data 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Maximum 
Parolees 86. 72 110. 66 39. 00 540. 00 
Stops 3,476. 00 3,859. 98 2,178. 00 22,647. 00 
Parolee per capita 0. 0018 0. 0022 0. 0012 0. 0163 
Stops per capita 0. 0758 0. 0723 0. 0532 0. 6205 
Fraction non-white 
  or Hispanic 
0. 63 0. 30 0. 61 1. 00 
Fraction household 
  income <$25,000 
0. 27 0. 15 0. 26 0. 63 
Fraction single-
  parent household 
0. 20 0. 13 0. 16 0. 48 
Number of zip codes: 188    
 
 By dividing the data by population, we are able to analyze the 
relationship between the number of parolees per capita in a particular area 
and the number of police stops per capita in that area—our third and fourth 
variables. Thus, we have both the “parolee count” and the “parolee rate” in 
the zip codes of New York City. When we conduct our regressions, we 
provide one model using parolee counts and controlling for population, and 
another model normalizing by population (dividing each variable by the 
population of the zip code). Actual parolee and stop rates are easy to 
interpret, but parolee per capita and stops per capita are advantageous 
because they control for population variance more directly. As such, we use 
parolees per capita and stops per capita for most of our analysis, but we 
display our first set of results using both count and rate variables for ease of 
comprehension. The results are highly consistent, regardless of which 
method is used. 
The summary statistics show that there is high variance in both 
parolees and stops, but is this variance random? To begin to address that 
question, we next map the geographic incidence of that variance. From this, 
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we see that not only is each variable distributed nonrandomly, but also 
there appears to be a strong relationship between the two. 
Figure 1 presents maps of the New York City population, first by 
density of parolees (Map A) and then by incidence of police stops (Map B). 
These two maps illustrate a strong coincidence between our two main 
variables of interest. Comparing them indicates that it is largely the same 
zip codes that have zero or close to zero parolee residents and those zip 
codes that have no or few stops. The same applies for medium and high-
density rates of each variable. When we contrast this to the map of the 
general city population (Map C), it is clear there is also significant 
crossover between both stops and parolee density and population density 
generally: parolees tend to live in high-density neighborhoods and the 
police conduct most stops in high-density neighborhoods. However, the 
highest density of both parolees and stops occurs within a subset of the 
most densely populated parts of the city—and it is the same subset for both 
our variables of interest. Clearly then, controlling for population is 
important, but population does not fully explain which areas the police 
choose to target.  
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FIGURE 1.  New York City Population Density Maps by Parolees and Stops 
MAP A.  Parolees 
 
MAP B.  Police Stops 
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          MAP D.  Parolees and Police Stops 
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When the incidence of parolees and stops are overlaid (Map D), we 
gain a strong impression that our two variables co-vary significantly—there 
is manifestly some kind of relationship between the two. We see below in 
our formal regression analysis that this relationship is statistically 
significant, but it is also clear from visual inspection that the relationship is 
substantively significant. The largest triangles, which represent the densest 
population of parolees, are approximately twenty times greater than the 
lowest category; similarly, the darkest regions, which represent the highest 
frequency of police stops, are approximately ten times greater than the 
lowest category. The largest triangles only occur in the two darkest shaded 
regions of the city. These maps show actual rates of parolees and stops, but 
the relationship is not undermined when instead we normalize by 
population. The correlation between parolees per capita and stops per 
capita is a solid 0.54.306 Clearly then, police are stopping individuals where 
parolees reside at far greater rates than individuals in parolee sparse 
districts.  
Of course, that relationship could be illusory: both variables could be 
driven by some other factor(s). To determine which variables we should 
control and whether the correlation between parolees and stops is real or 
spurious, we need to think first about the mechanism by which police are 
likely to target parolees. In Floyd v. City of New York, the case on racial 
profiling by the NYPD, the claim was that police observe individuals of 
minority races and stop them because of their race, rather than because of 
any suspicious activity.307 In some cases, parolee status may be similarly 
observed: individual parolees will be known to individual police officers. 
As discussed, parole officers and the NYPD participate in joint ride-alongs 
and share a criminal database. Police officers may also have been involved 
in the parolee’s arrest, or officers, walking their beat, may have had prior 
contact with the individuals after their release on parole. In other cases, the 
officer may be considering parolee status probabilistically: the officer 
knows that the neighborhood has a high rate of parolee residences, either 
because the officer knows the neighborhood well, or because of publicly 
available cues, such as the presence of halfway houses. Knowing a 
neighborhood has a high rate of parolees, an officer conducting a stop is 
 
 306. The correlation coefficient measures the strength of the linear relationship between two 
variables. It ranges between -1 (a perfect negative relationship) through 0 (no relationship) to 1 (a 
perfect positive relationship). The square of the coefficient is generally interpreted as the percentage of 
variation in one variable that can be explained by the other. A correlation between 0.5 and 1 is generally 
considered to be a moderately strong relationship. DAVID M. LANE, ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO 
STATISTICS 170 (1993).  
 307. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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likely to ask an individual, “Are you on parole?” since, as discussed earlier, 
a positive answer lowers the threshold for a search of the individual. 
Effective screening is likely both because parolees face serious 
consequences for lying to the police about their status and because police 
on the street now typically carry handheld devices through which they can 
quickly check an individual’s parole status. 
Similarly, most police are also likely to know which areas are largely 
made up of low-income households and to use income as a screening 
device for suspicion. Income is often roughly visually apparent at the 
individual level based on clothing, hair, idle presence on the street during 
business hours, and the like. Furthermore, police are likely to target high-
crime areas, which strongly tend to be low-income areas. At the same time, 
parolees can be expected to live in low-income neighborhoods. As such, 
low income could conceivably explain the apparent relationship between 
parolees and stops. In fact, low income is correlated with police stops at 
0.46, and with parolees at 0.54. These are solid relationships that imply it is 
important to control for income in our regression analysis. 
The difference is that while low income might be a proxy for 
suspicion in the eyes of many police officers, it does not translate to greater 
powers of searching with a lower threshold, as does parolee status. Parolee 
frequency serves a threefold advantage: as a proxy for crime (given high 
recidivism rates), as a means of leverage (as discussed in Part III.B), and as 
a means of lowering the threshold for further intrusion on Fourth 
Amendment rights. As such, we recognize the need to control for other 
screening mechanisms such as low income, but we do not expect it to 
capture, or even be as informative as, the effects of parolee density, simply 
because of the incentives for police to focus on parolee status.  
There are other variables that could play a similar role. The fraction of 
non-white or Hispanic residents in the neighborhood is correlated at 0.46 
with stops and 0.62 with parolees. Single-parent households correlate with 
stops at 0.53 and with parolees at 0.68. As such, it is important to control 
for all of these variables in our statistical analyses. A final factor that we 
might expect could also constitute an omitted variable is the crime rate, but 
we do not control for this factor. Doing so could create a reverse causation 
problem. Significantly more stops are likely to occur in high-crime 
neighborhoods, but stops—and the subsequent arrests—constitute one of 
the primary means by which crime rates themselves are determined. As 
such, we cannot include crime rate as a control, but between our control 
variables of income, race, and single-parent household, we are likely to 
have captured much of the screening effect of high crime rates. 
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Furthermore, we are able to control for crime rates in other ways when we 
look at the individual data. 
To examine the relationship between parolee density and stops, we 
first graphically represent the correlation between them, as well as the 
relationship between each and the incidence of low-income residents. 
Figure 2A represents the association between parolee density and police 
stop frequency, in nominal rates. Figure 2B represents the same 
relationship normalized by population. The two scatter plots are of each zip 
code, with the density of parolees and parolees per capita, respectively, 
displayed on the X axes, and stops and stops per capita displayed on the Y 
axes. The diagonal lines are the lines that best fit each zip code’s parolee-
stop relationship.  
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FIGURE 2.  Police Stops by Parolees and Parolees Per Capita 
FIGURE 2A.  Police Stops by Parolees 
 
FIGURE 2B.  Police Stops by Parolees Per Capita 
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There is a manifest positive relationship between our two variables of 
interest, and this relationship becomes even clearer when population is 
considered. Most zip codes cluster around the low parolee-stop region 
(lower left corner), and stops become significantly more frequent as parolee 
density increases (upper right corner).  
The gray shaded regions are the 95% confidence intervals of the fitted 
value lines for each figure. The confidence interval is a measure of 
uncertainty: we can say with 95% confidence that the true relationship 
between the two variables is a line within the shaded area. Here, the 
confidence range is narrow around the high gradient of the line, showing 
there is significant difference between zip codes and that substantial 
increases in parolees are correlated with substantial increases in stops, with 
less than a 5% chance of random variation explaining the apparent 
relationship between the two variables.  
B.  REGRESSION RESULTS: STOP DATA 
Our various descriptive statistics have provided a strong 
impressionistic account of the relationship between parolee density and 
police stops. To better discern that relationship while controlling for other 
factors, we now conduct Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis 
(“OLS”), including these control variables. Table 2 shows the results. 
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TABLE 2.  Stops Per Capita & Stops as a Product of Parolee Density, and 
Control Variables 
 
Variables Stops Per Capita Stops 
Parolee per capita 10. 78** …  
 (2. 80)   
Parolee …      17.  64** 
  (2. 94) 
Income below $25,000 0. 04  995. 22  
 (0. 06) (2325. 25) 
Non-white / Hispanic 0. 01  777. 14  
 (0. 03) (1037. 85) 
Single-parent household 0. 11  2771. 30  
(0. 08) (3844. 00) 
Population … 0. 04  
  (0. 01) 
Intercept308 0. 02  -999. 42  
 (0. 01) (516. 37) 






* = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01309  
 
 308. This captures the point where the regression line crosses the y-axis, when all our independent 
variables are set to zero—that is, how many stops are predicted to occur when there are no parolees, no 
single-parent households, etc. in the neighborhood. The number of stops predicted under those 
circumstances is not differentiable from zero. 
 309. The p-value is the measure of how likely the data is to have occurred by chance if the null 
hypothesis is true. The lower the p-value, the more certain we can be that the effect is nonrandom. A p-
value of 0.05 is the standard measure for statistical significance; a p-value of 0.01 is the standard 
measure of being highly statistically significant. They translate to a 95% and a 99% confidence of a 
genuine effect having occurred, respectively. DAVID M. LANE, ET AL., supra note 306, at 376 
(explaining statistical significance and significance testing). 
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The first column of Table 2 shows per capita parolee rates regressed 
on per capita stops, with the standard deviation below in parentheses. The 
second column shows nominal parolee density rates regressed on nominal 
police stops, with population as a control variable. For both models, we 
control for income, race, and single-parent household status. Here, our race 
variable shows the fraction of non-white or Hispanic residents in the zip 
code. In the individual Frisk, Search, and Arrest Data, below, we use both 
this community race variable and an individualized race variable. 
As predicted, the parolee coefficients in both models are positive and 
highly statistically significant. The p-values of 0.00 for each of the parolee 
coefficients mean that we have a 99% confidence level that there is a 
relationship between parolee residency and police stops. This provides 
strong support for our hypothesis that the density of parolees residing in a 
neighborhood also significantly increases the frequency of police stops.310 
All of our control variables—frequency of low income, minority race, and 
single-parent households—are also positive, as expected. However, none of 
the controls except population reach statistical significance—not even race. 
We discuss the significance of our race nonresults in the next section. 
The parolee-per-capita coefficient of 10.78 means that increasing 
parolees per capita by 1 increases stops per capita more than tenfold. For 
example, increasing parolees per capita by 0.001 per capita would increase 
stops per capita by 0.011. Similarly, the parolee-rate coefficient of 17.64 
means that an increase in a given zip code by one parolee increases the 
average number of stops by almost 18. These are large changes—remember 
that we are not measuring the number of stops of parolees, but the number 
of stops of all people in the overall zip code, subject to the variation of 
parolees residing in the neighborhood. Given that even in the most dense 
parolee neighborhood, the vast majority of people are not parolees, this is a 
massive effect. So as well as being statistically significant, our results have 
 
 310. Parolee rates also maintain statistical significance in other models not reported here. The only 
model in which parolees per capita fractionally loses statistical significance is when all the control 
variables are included and unemployment is also included. Unemployment has a high correlation with 
single-family status, to the point where it effectively double counts in the regression. In fact, the 
adjusted R-squared actually decreases when unemployment is included. We consider that single-family 
status is more relevant for our inquiry than unemployment, given that income is already controlled. This 
is particularly true given that the unemployment rate does not count those who have dropped out of the 
labor force. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—MARCH 2014, at 2 (2014), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf. Even including unemployment, parolee density 
nevertheless remains significant when not normalized by population. Additional analysis available from 
the authors. 
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considerable substantive significance.  
We can consider the overall effect of the difference between a 
medium-density parolee neighborhood and a high-density parolee 
neighborhood on the predicted rate of stops. We do this by looking at how 
many stops occur when all variables are set at the median and how many 
stops occur when parolees are set at some other level. Looking at parolees 
per capita and stops per capita, an increase of one standard deviation311 in 
parolees per capita translates to about a 24% increase in stops per capita. 
That is, almost one-quarter of the variation between neighborhoods is 
explained by an increase of one standard deviation in parolees per capita. 
Similarly, an increase in the parolee rate from the median value, 39, by one 
standard deviation to 111, translates to stops per capita increasing from 
2374 stops to 3638, an increase of about 53%.  
Given the high divergence between neighborhoods, in terms of both 
stops and parolee rates, and given that the vast majority of both occur in 
only a handful of zip codes, it is also worth comparing the top and bottom 
tenth percentile zip codes. All other things being equal, the bottom decile 
zip code has only approximately one parolee; the ninetieth percentile has 
252. The difference in the expected number of stops is 1704 versus 6131. 
Moving from the lowest parolee-dense bracket of neighborhoods to the 
highest translates to a 260% increase in the number of stops. The same 
movement when measured in parolees per capita results in an 88% 
increase. 
In terms of overall explanatory power, our stop models do very well. 
Once our key variable of interest, parolee density, is included along with 
the control variables, the R-squared of both regression models is high. The 
variation in police stops when considering the control variables plus either 
parolee per capita or parolee rates, respectively, is 33% and 67%. This 
means that our parolee independent variable and the control variables have 
explained a large proportion of police choice in stopping individuals. 
The fact that we are showing a double-digit increase in the number of 
overall stops in a zip code, not the stops of parolees alone, shows strong 
support for the argument that both individual parolees and the community 
generally are being dramatically affected by the permissive police parolee 
stop and search jurisprudence. Given that parolees form a very small 
percentage of the population even in high-density neighborhoods, if there 
 
 311. When data is distributed normally, one standard deviation in either direction from the median 
accounts for 34.1% of the distribution. 
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was not an effect on the community, in order to explain these numbers, 
parolees would have to be being stopped at well beyond the 10- or 18-fold 
increase indicated by the coefficients, but closer to thousands of stops in a 
year—or multiple stops per parolee per day. Far more plausible is the 
conclusion that police are targeting high parolee neighborhoods but 
regularly stopping nonparolees. Thus the lowered rights of parolees have 
the effect of diminishing the rights of their neighbors, an effect the Samson 
court never endorsed. 
C.  INDIVIDUAL FRISK, SEARCH AND ARREST: DESCRIPTIVE DATA 
We now turn to the question of what happens after the police have 
stopped an individual—do they frisk, search, and/or arrest the individual? 
Our individual Frisk, Search, and Arrest Data comprises over 678,000 
observations, where each observation is an instance of a police officer 
stopping a person in New York City in 2011, rather than stops at the zip 
code level. It also contains demographic detail about every individual who 
was stopped.  
The difficulty for the second prong of our investigation—whether, 
once stopped, parole status affects whether a secondary Terry outcome 
occurs—is that we do not know the parolee status of the individual stopped, 
only the parolee density of the zip code. We hypothesize that there is a link 
not only between whether an individual is a parolee and whether the 
individual will be stopped, but also with whether he or she will then be 
frisked, searched, and/or arrested. But for us to find such effects, given that 
the data is aggregated and nonspecified for parole status, police would have 
to be targeting parolees consistently enough for the effect to show at the 
aggregate level. Thus, this difficulty is in some ways a strength: if we can 
find support for our hypotheses that parolees are subjected to more searches 
and arrests based on this aggregate data, then the effect of police targeting 
of parolees must be strong indeed. 
Table 3 provides the descriptive information about our second 
database. Table 3A details the breakdown of our dependent variables, the 
Terry actions taken following a stop (whether the individual was frisked, 
searched, and/or arrested), and the central control variable of race. Column 
1 provides the racial breakdown of those stopped and Column 2 provides 
the racial breakdown of the general population of New York City. Note that 
the latter data was gathered from a different source, uses slightly different 
categorizations, and is for 2010 rather 2011. Nonetheless, it provides a 
mechanism for rough comparisons. Table 3B lists the breakdown of the 
Terry factors specified by the police as reasons justifying each stop.  
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 Two variables listed at the bottom of Table 3B are factors in whether 
the police chose to frisk the individual, rather than reasons to stop the 
individual. The first is furtive movements, a variable that can be a factor in 
a suspect being stopped or frisked. Furtive movements were a sign of 
suspicion used to justify the majority of stops, and also the majority of 
frisks.312 The second factor is knowledge of the suspect’s prior criminal 
behavior, which is one indication that, at least in some cases, police have 
knowledge of individuals’ criminal history, as we discuss further below. 
This factor is the closest we have to the parolee status of the individual 
stopped, although obviously it does not distinguish between convicts and 
parolees. We expect this to have a positive relationship with searches and 
arrests. We discuss each of these variables in greater detail below. 
Remember that the percentages listed are of those already stopped. 
 
 
 312. Furtive movements are pointed to in order to justify the frisk in 70.84% of frisks, but this is 
only 39.77% of all observations, since frisks occur in approximately half of stops. 
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New York City 
population, 
2010313 
Terry Action    
Frisk 56. 14   
Search 8. 44   
Arrest 5. 91   
Race     
Black 50. 59 Black/African 
  American Non-
  Hispanic 
 22.8314 
Black Hispanic 7. 00 Hispanic Origin 28.  6 
White Hispanic 26. 40 
Asian 3. 43 Asian Non-
  Hispanic 
12. 6 
White Non-
  Hispanic 
8. 90 White Non-
  Hispanic 
33. 3 
Other 3. 85 Other  2. 7 
Number of stops: 678,092   
 
 
313.    Results from the 2010 Census: Population Growth and Race/Hispanic Composition, CITY OF 
N.Y. 14 (2011), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/census/census2010/pgrhc.pdf. 
314. The United States Census Bureau estimates African Americans as 25.5% of the population, but 
that seems to include “Black Hispanics.” State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). 
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TABLE 3B.  Frisk, Search, and Arrest Data (Terry Factors) 
Terry Factors Percentage of stopped individuals, 2011 
Area has high crime 
  incidence 
58. 75 
Furtive movements (stop) 51. 85 
Casing a victim or location 32. 07 
Proximity to scene of 
  offense 
21. 09 
Suspect acting as a lookout 17. 96 
Fits a relevant description 15. 68 
Ongoing investigation 14. 27 
Report by victim / witness / 
  officer 
11. 29 
Actions of engaging in a 
  violent crime 
10. 32 
Suspicious bulge 7. 98 
Actions indicative of a 
  drug transaction 
7. 26 
Wearing clothes commonly 
  used in a crime 
4. 54 
Associating with known 
  criminals 
4. 12 
Carrying suspicious object 2. 36 
Other 16. 33 
Frisk Factors Percentage of individuals frisked, 2011 
Furtive movements (frisk) 70. 84 
Knowledge of suspect’s 
  prior criminal behavior 
  (frisk) 
1. 57 
Total  166.35 
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The first set of variables described is the Terry actions taken by the 
police. The rates of arrests and searches are considerably lower than the 
rate of frisks—more than half of those stopped are frisked, compared to 
single digit percentages for searches and arrests. This is not surprising since 
to conduct a frisk the police ordinarily need only have reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the individual may be carrying a concealed 
weapon that could pose a danger to the officers,315 whereas conducting an 
arrest or an actual search requires probable cause, a more rigorous 
standard.316 But as described, the jurisprudence surrounding the rights of 
parolees permits both thresholds to be effectively lowered in numerous 
ways. 
Previously, we hypothesized that parolee density would be positively 
correlated with police stops, which our results from the first database 
supported. Here we similarly expect that searches and arrests will be 
positively correlated with parolee density. We expect that as well as 
targeting parolees for stops, having stopped a parolee, police will have the 
power and incentive to search parolees at higher rates than others who have 
been stopped. And given that searches form the primary basis for arrest 
stemming from Terry stops, the rate of arrests should also be higher for 
parolees.  
In addition to the direct effect on parolees, the leverage effects we 
described in Part III.B should also spill over to the families and cotenants 
of parolees, and even the wider community. By targeting parolee-dense 
neighborhoods, police will conduct more stops against nonparolees in those 
zip codes, giving them more of an opportunity to develop probable cause 
against nonparolees, even those who are unrelated to parolees. 
Consequently, we expect to see an increase in searches and arrests in 
parolee-dense neighborhoods, even when looking at aggregate numbers of 
stops. 
Our expectation for the relationship between parolee density and frisks 
is more complex. For the reasons just summarized, New York police 
effectively face a lower threshold for searching parolees than nonparolees, 
 
 315. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“And in justifying the particular intrusion the police 
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”). The fact that nonetheless the majority 
of people stopped are frisked arguably illustrates the lax nature of the reasonable suspicion standard 
under Terry. 
 316. Courts require that “facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man 
of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed.” Draper v. United States, 358 
U.S. 307, 322 (1959) (quoting Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878)).  
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given that parolee status allows otherwise unsuspicious factors to be 
considered suspicious, and even evidence that violates the standard will not 
be suppressed at parole hearings. This gives less incentive to police to 
conduct a frisk instead of a full search when they have stopped a parolee. 
Thus, while we expect a positive relationship between parolee status and 
searches and arrests, we could see a negative relationship between frisks 
and parolee status. However, if this frisk-skipping effect exists, it only 
applies to parolees; it does not share the spillover effect described for 
searches and arrests. As such, even if police are skipping frisks for all 
parolees who are stopped, it may be hard to show this effect, since our data 
captures stops of all individuals without differentiating between parolees 
and nonparolees, factoring only the relative density of neighborhoods by 
parolee rates. 
It may seem likely that if police target parolees, they may also target 
convicts generally. Given recidivism rates, convict status might serve as a 
proxy for suspicion for many police officers. However, as with our 
discussion of low income, we argue that parole status is special because it 
not only may serve as a proxy for suspicion, but also it allows police to 
search with a lower threshold of cause. Those who have served time in 
prison but have completed their parole period are not subject to the more 
permissive search rules we have detailed. The difference between the single 
advantage of targeting convicts—as a proxy for crime—and the triple 
advantage of targeting parolees—as a proxy for crime, as a means of 
leverage, and as a means of lowering the threshold for closer investigation 
without regard for normal Fourth Amendment rights—allows us to 
differentiate between targeting of parolees versus convicts. If police are just 
targeting high convict areas, we should observe an increase in all three 
Terry outcomes; if they are targeting parolees in particular, we should see 
that heightened parolee density leads to an increase in searches and arrests 
but a decrease in frisks, given the fact of a stop. 
The second set of variables in Table 3 is the individual race variables. 
As before in our Stop Data, we again control for the racial makeup of the 
zip code that the individuals are stopped in, but here we also control for the 
race of each individual stopped by the police. The numbers in Table 3 
provide the prima facie case in the challenge to police practices in the 
Floyd case. According to the records of the police themselves, the majority 
of people stopped by the police are black (even excluding black Hispanics), 
whereas less than one quarter of the general population is black. In 
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contrast, less than 10% of those stopped are non-Hispanic whites.317 The 
city’s defense to the implication of racial discrimination was that minorities 
commit more crimes. However, the judge in Floyd rejected this argument, 
since “[t]here is no basis for assuming that an innocent population shares 
the same characteristics as the criminal suspect population in the same 
area.”318 
The third set of variables in Table 3 is the Terry factors—the 
conditions that gave rise to the reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
justified the initial stop. Since we are now looking at individual 
observations rather than at the zip code level, it is safe to incorporate the 
crime rate. As Table 3 shows, the most common Terry factor is that the 
individual was in a high-crime neighborhood. The second most common 
Terry factor was that the individual was displaying furtive movements. 
Displaying furtive movements is a highly subjective characterization, one 
that is difficult for anyone to challenge, and so it gives police enormous 
discretion in articulating reasonable suspicion. Both high-crime 
neighborhood and furtive movements were pointed to in over half of the 
stops made, yet the correlation between them is only 0.05. This indicates 
that almost every Terry stop in our data was justified either by occurring in 
a high-crime neighborhood or by an individual’s furtive movements. The 
total percentage of Terry factors listed is 166.35%—this implies that for the 
average stop, 1.66 Terry factors were detailed. Thus, police either choose to 
target individuals in a high-crime neighborhood or they subjectively 
characterize an individual’s movements as furtive, then they typically only 
point to at most one other suspicion-generating factor to have effective 
discretion over the determination of reasonable articulable suspicion in the 
vast majority of stops. 
D.  REGRESSION RESULTS: INDIVIDUAL FRISK, SEARCH, AND ARREST 
DATA 
Table 4 shows the results of our regressions for the Frisk, Search, and 
Arrest Data. Table 4 contains three separate regressions, one for each Terry 
outcome—frisk, search and arrest. We report the OLS regressions, since 
they are the most intuitively comprehensible. However, since now our three 
dependent (outcome) variables are binary—each Terry outcome of frisk, 
 
 317. For the details of the claim of police racial targeting, see generally Jeffrey Fagan, Second 
Supplemental Report, CTR. CONST. RTS. 11 (2012), http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/ 
FaganSecondSupplementalReport.pdf. Fagan’s expert report was considered as evidence in Floyd v. 
City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 318. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 560. 
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search and/or arrest either occurs or does not occur—we also conduct the 
analysis using both logit and probit. These methods use the probability of 
the dependent variable occurring as the outcome. For instance, instead of 
an either-or outcome for whether a search occurred, logit and probit 
regressions determine the probability of a search occurring, contingent on 
the independent variables of interest, such as parole status.319 All of the 
results using either logit or probit are consistent with the OLS results 
reported in Table 4.320 We display a more meaningful interpretation of the 
results of the logit regressions in Figure 3 below. 
 
 
 319. Logit and probit are both designed for estimation of nonlinear effects, in particular for 
determining the effect of binary outcomes. Whereas OLS estimates the marginal, linear effect of each 
additional unit of the X variable on the Y variable (for example, how many additional stops are 
associated with each additional parolee living in the neighborhood), logit and probit estimate the 
contrasting probability of Y occurring or not occurring, subject to variation in X (for example, how 
likely an individual is to be frisked, arrested or searched, or for none of the these events to occur, 
depending on parolee density in the neighborhood). See generally Forrest D. Nelson, Logit, Probit and 
Togit, in ECONOMETRICS: THE NEW PALGRAVE 136 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1990). The difference 
between logit and probit arises from the assumptions made about the distribution of the error term. 
Whereas logit assumes a logistic distribution, probit assumes a normal distribution. VANI K. BOROOAH, 
LOGIT AND PROBIT: ORDERED AND MULTINOMIAL MODELS 9 (2001). 
 320. These coefficients do not have an intuitive meaning without being converted into either odds 
ratios or probabilities. The reason for this is that a logit coefficient represents a movement along a 
nonlinear scale; consequently the effect of a 1 unit change in the independent variable will depend on 
the point at which that change begins. Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, & Matthew M. Schneider, On 
the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1813 (2006). 
Logit and probit regressions cannot be interpreted directly beyond whether the coefficients are positive 
or negative, and whether they are statistically significant. All of the logit and probit regressions of our 
data follow the same patterns reported in our OLS data, both as to whether the coefficients are positive 
or negative, and the level of statistical significance. The only exceptions are that single-parent status is a 
significant factor in arrests at the 0.01 level using both logit and probit; white individual is not 
significant for arrests when using logit but is significant when using probit; and income under $25,000 
is significant when parolee rates are used to predict arrests, but not when parolees per capita are used, 
under logit and probit regressions. Overall, our OLS regressions are more conservative than either the 
logit or probit regressions, so we report the OLS results. 
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TABLE 4.  Frisk, Search, and Arrest as a Product of Parolee Per Capita, and 
Control Variables 
 Frisk Search Arrest 
Community traits   
Parolee per capita -2.  96** 3.  73* 5.  87* 
(0. 52) (0. 29)* (0. 00)* 
Non-white / 
  Hispanic 
0.  18** 0.  01* -0. 00 
(0. 00) (0. 00)* (0. 00) 
Income below 
  $25,000 
0.  30** 0.  03* -0. 00 
(0. 01) (0. 00)* (0. 00) 
Single-parent 
  households 
-0.  20** 0.  12* -0. 10 
(0. 01) (0. 01)* (0. 01) 
Individual traits / Terry factors  
White individual -0.  08** 0.  00* 0.  00* 
(0. 00) (0. 00)* (0. 00)* 
Proximity to scene 
  of offense 
0.  02** 0.  02* 0.  01* 
(0. 00) (0. 00)* (0. 00)* 
Associating with 
  known criminals 
0.  10** 0.  01* 0.  01* 
(0. 00) (0. 00)* (0. 00)* 
Area has high crime 
  incidence 
0.  02* -0.  01* 0.  02* 
(0. 00) (0. 00)* (0. 00)* 
Report by victim / 
  witness / officer 
0.  04** 0.  01* 0.  09* 
(0. 00) (0. 00)* (0. 00)* 
Ongoing 
  investigation 
0.  07** 0.  01* 0.  00* 
(0. 00) (0. 00)* (0. 00)* 
Prior knowledge of 
  criminal history  
… 0.  06* 0.  03* 
 (0. 00)* (0. 00)* 
Intercept 0.  37** 0. 08* 0.  07* 
(0. 00) (0. 00)* (0. 00)* 








* = p < 0.05; ** = p <0.01 
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Most significantly, our parolee per capita variable is again in the 
direction hypothesized and highly statistically significant for each of our 
three regressions. The results are unchanged when using parole rates.321  
Frisks are negatively associated with being in a parolee-dense area, 
whereas searches and arrests are positively associated with being in a 
parolee-dense area. This supports our theory that (1) not only do police 
target parolee-rich areas for increased stops, but also they utilize permissive 
rules that enable them to search parolees more easily, skipping the 
intermediary step of frisking; that (2) they subject parolees to significantly 
more searches; and that (3) consequently more arrests are made of parolees. 
This also suggests that police are not simply targeting convicts, but are 
specifically targeting parolees; otherwise, if police were targeting convicts 
generally, we would see positive coefficients on all three Terry outcome 
variables.  
However, the substantive significance of these results varies 
considerably for the three different inquiries. The coefficients reported 
describe the average effect for each outcome. The frisk, search, and arrest 
terms of -2.96, 3.73, and 5.87, respectively, mean that on average, an 
increase in the parolee per capita population by one percentage point would 
decrease the per capita risk of being frisked by 2.96%, increase the per 
capita chance of being searched by 3.73%, and increase the per capita 
chance of being arrested by 5.87%. But the relative size of the three 
coefficients somewhat understates the differing effect for each variable, as 
illustrated when we once again compare the effect of an increase of one 
standard deviation from the median for each regression. While a change of 
one standard deviation in parolees per capita almost doubles the number of 
parolees in a zip code (an approximately 80% increase), the associated 
decrease in the probability of being frisked is 1.1%, which is relatively 
slight. As such, the effect for frisks, although statistically significant, is 
quite small. For searches, the same increase in parolees per capita increases 
the predicted probability of being searched by 12.9%, a considerably more 
substantively significant increase that is more than ten times the negative 
effect for frisks. For arrests, the effect is greater still. An 80% increase in 
parolees per capita is associated with a 35.6% increase in arrests following 
a stop, an effect that is 30-fold larger than for frisks and a threefold larger 
than for searches. 
When we again compare the top and bottom deciles, a shift from the 
bottom to the top parolee per capita decile results in the predicted rate of 
 
 321. Results available from the authors. 
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stops increasing by about 87%; the predicted rate of frisks decreasing by 
only 2.8%; the predicted rate of searches increasing by a moderate 37%; 
and the predicted rate of arrests increasing a substantial 141%.  
Consequently, we can have confidence statistically that each 
hypothesized parole effect on Terry outcomes occurs, but the negative 
effect for frisks is substantially less distinct than the positive effect of 
parolee density on searches and the overwhelmingly positive effect on 
arrests. The most obvious reason is that, once stopped, an individual is 
more likely than not to be frisked, regardless of parolee status, whereas 
searches and arrests occur far more selectively, and so parolee status seems 
to have more of an impact on whether the police search or arrest.322 
Furthermore, remember that we are examining the effect of parolee 
jurisprudence on not only parolees who are stopped, but also on 
nonparolees who are stopped. Only for parolees can the police expect to 
need less suspicion for a search than probable cause to be able to use 
anything found to develop probable cause for an arrest. As anticipated, we 
observe a much bigger impact in the search and arrest statistics than in frisk 
statistics. We believe this is because the pool of parolees in the population 
of individuals who are searched and arrested is far more concentrated, since 
the police are targeting parolees at higher rates than nonparolees. The frisk 
effect we describe may be real, but identifying it is difficult: the numbers 
are diluted by frisks of nonparolees, since ultimately frisking stopped 
individuals is the norm. 
In fact, the relationship between parolee density and Terry outcomes 
must be quite high for our results to appear at all, since our data covers all 
frisks, searches, and arrests, as discussed in our hypotheses section. It is for 
this reason that we see a very low R-squared. This effect is normal in 
individual studies of this kind. We do not have high predictive levels since 
most people will not be searched or arrested, even those who are stopped. 
 
 322. The classification that the police use makes no apparent distinction between pre- and post-
arrest searches. Thus, it is unclear how many of the searches are searches incident to arrest. The 
correlation between arrests and searches is slightly less than one half (0.4956), so they are clearly not 
perfectly correlated. In terms of conditional probabilities, if an individual is searched, the odds that he 
or she was frisked are extremely high (95.7%), but the odds of being frisked even when not searched 
are still better than even (52.5%). In contrast, people are seldom searched without being frisked (0.03% 
of all cases), whereas almost half the people are frisked but never searched (48% of stops). Once 
frisked, the conditional probability of being searched is 14.3%, and the odds of being searched when not 
frisked are 0.8%. That 0.8% can arise in two possible scenarios: when the police have probable cause 
early in the encounter such that they are likely to search immediately without bothering with the frisk, 
or with parolees, for whom they require only reasonable suspicion to search rather than probable cause. 
With parolees constituting only 0.02% of the overall population, they may well be routinely 
prophylactically searched and thus make up a large portion of those who are searched but not frisked. 
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Put another way, there is a lot of noise inherent in our data. As such, our 
theory is greatly buoyed by the fact that we are able to find an effect, even 
though we are looking at aggregated data for all stops rather than stops of 
parolees only. 
These results assume that the effects must all be linear. Next we use 
logit to check whether the results are robust when that assumption is 
relaxed. A good way to predict and interpret probabilities from a logit (or 
probit) model is to create a simulation of the parameters based on the 
regression and run that simulation again and again. Generally 1000 times is 
adequate.323 Our logit regression involves multiple factors that vary 
simultaneously, so to graph the relationship between just two of those 
variables (the predicted probabilities of our Terry outcomes as against 
parolees per capita), we have to choose a setting for each of the control 
variables. Households earning under $25,000 and single-parent households 
are both continuous variables, so we set them to their means. All the other 
control variables are dichotomous, and most occur rarely, so we set them to 
zero, with two exceptions: first, as mentioned, the majority of stops occur 
in high-crime neighborhoods, so we set that variable to one; second, since 
race is generally considered to be of particular significance in stops, we 
conduct our analysis for both stops of minorities and stops of whites. We 
then use a program that draws 1000 sets of simulated parameters for each 
variable, creating a new set of variables for each coefficient324 that we 
graph in Figure 3. 
 
 323. See Michael Tomz et al., Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical 
Results, J. STAT. SOFTWARE, Jan. 2003, at 1, 3, 6, available at http://www.jstatsoft.org/v08/i01/paper 
(prescribing a Monte Carlo method of stochastic simulation for each parameter, with 1000 draws from 
the distribution usually being sufficient).  
 324. Id. at 5 (“Clarify uses stochastic simulation techniques to help researchers interpret and 
present their statistical results. It uses whatever statistical model you have chosen and, as such, changes 
no statistical assumptions. As a first step, the program draws simulations of the main and ancillary 
parameters from . . . their asymptomatic sampling distribution, in most cases a multivariate normal with 
mean equal to the vector of parameter estimates . . . and variance equal to the variance-covariance 
matrix of estimates . . . .”). 
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FIGURE 3.  Changes in the Logit Predicted Probability of Frisks, Searches, 
and Arrests, By Parolees Per Capita, For Whites and Non-Whites, in High-
Crime Neighborhoods 
FIGURE 3A.  Whites 
FIGURE 3B.  Non-Whites 
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Figures 3A and 3B display parolees per capita on the x-axis and the 
probabilities of frisks, searches, and arrests on the y-axis. In both figures, 
searches and arrests increase consistently with parolees and frisks decrease 
consistently. The slope of each vector appears compressed by the large 
difference in scale. Recall that the base probability of being frisked is more 
than 50%, whereas the base probability of being searched or arrested is less 
than 10%. The change in each variable is comfortably outside the 95% 
shaded confidence interval. (In other words, the shift on the y-axis is 
greater than the shaded range on that axis.)  
The results are robust. We also conducted all of the frisk, search, and 
arrest regressions including fixed effects dummy variables for each of the 
76 police precincts in our data. This essentially adds a control variable for 
each different police precinct, which allows unknown idiosyncratic 
differences between neighborhoods or precincts to be accounted for 
without affecting our results. This enables us to be confident that there is 
no omitted variable bias due to the fact that high parolee per capita 
neighborhoods are “bad neighborhoods” in a way not captured by our 
control variables, such as high crime incidence. It also immunizes the data 
to problems arising from differences between different policies in different 
police precincts. The signs and significance of our three dependent 
variables remain the same for these regressions.325  
All of the control variables are highly significant at the p < 0.01 level, 
except for three in the arrest regression, which are not statistically 
significant at any level, and almost all are in the direction expected. It is 
worth noting that both race variables are significant, but not consistently in 
the direction expected. An expert report from the Floyd litigation found 
that individuals were being targeted for police stops on the basis of their 
race, but the report did not take account of parolee status.326 Our results 
show that the effect of race is more complicated once parolee status is 
accounted for. As stated previously in relation to the probability of being 
stopped, the non-white/Hispanic variable is again positive for frisks and 
searches, meaning that the likelihood of being frisked or searched if you are 
in a minority-dense neighborhood is significantly higher than if you are in a 
predominantly white neighborhood. However, the individual race variable, 
 
 325. The effects in these regressions are in fact stronger for frisks and searches, with coefficients 
of -5.22 and 4.06, respectively. The effect for arrests is slightly lower, with a coefficient of 4.16, but the 
coefficient is still positive and highly statistically significant. Additional results available from the 
authors. 
 326. Fagan, supra note 317, at 18 tbl.5. 
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“white individual,” is negative for frisks and positive for searches and 
arrests. Thus, once stopped, whites are less likely to be frisked but more 
likely to be searched or arrested. 
This is reflected in that the only real difference between Figures 3A 
and 3B is that, consistent with the OLS results, non-whites are consistently 
frisked at higher rates than whites, but they are searched and arrested at 
lower rates. Thus whether using OLS or logit, parolees per capita is 
consistently associated with increased searches and arrests, and decreased 
frisks, and race has effects in both directions. 
This does not show that police are not targeting minorities, since our 
Stop Data showed that police stop people in densely minority 
neighborhoods at significantly higher rates than in predominantly white 
neighborhoods. The lowered frisk result supports previous studies that have 
shown that “hit rates”—the proportion of searches that actually result in 
finding contraband—are higher for whites than minorities, which suggests 
that the level of suspicion necessary for a white person to be stopped may 
be higher than for a minority in the eyes of the police.327 However it does 
complicate the picture somewhat: this data does not show that searches and 
arrests are higher for minorities; that is only true for frisks. Together, the 
results of our two databases imply that police may be targeting high 
minority neighborhoods rather than minorities themselves. 
Two other aberrant results are that single-parent households are 
negatively correlated with frisks, as are searches within areas having high 
crime incidence. We have no clear theory for these two results. Otherwise, 
all of the community traits are positively associated with searches and 
frisks, consistent with our Stop Data. (The coefficients for arrests are non-
differentiable from zero.) All of the other Terry factors are positively 
related to each Terry outcome. This is unsurprising since each of these 
factors contributes towards reasonable suspicion, and each is used to justify 
each police action.  
One variable worthy of particular scrutiny is the frisk being justified 
(at least in part) by knowledge of prior criminal history. The knowledge of 
 
 327. L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 
2037–38 (2011) (summarizing hit rates in six different states and cities and showing that some 
minorities are often twice as likely to be stopped as whites, yet the hit rate for whites is often one and a 
half or more times greater). For a critique of whether these discrepancies in hit rates necessarily 
establish racial discrimination, see Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the 
Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1299 (2004) (arguing that whether racial profiling will decrease the amount of 
profile crime depends on the elasticity of each racial groups’ willingness to offend).  
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criminal history factor is used to justify frisks, so we have to omit it from 
the frisk regression, but it is positively associated with searches and arrests. 
This variable is somewhat of a proxy, albeit an over-inclusive one, for 
knowledge of the individual’s parole status. Our Stop Data supports the 
theory that police often have knowledge of either individual parolee status 
or of parolee density in a given neighborhood. The positive and significant 
result for the knowledge of prior criminal history variable suggests that 
knowledge of criminal history status, which may include parole status, may 
also increase the police tendency to not only frisk but also to search and 
arrest. However, it may not. The result may simply be driven by more 
contraband being found when more frisks are undertaken, which is quite 
plausible given recidivism rates. Nonetheless, the former view is further 
supported by the fact that our results for the parolee-per-capita coefficients 
for both searches and frisks are reduced when this variable is included. 
This suggests that police do in fact have knowledge of parolee status—at 
least after initiating contact, if not before initiating the stop—and so they 
are more likely to stop, frisk, search, and arrest parolees. As mentioned, 
this effect is so strong that we see it reflected in the fact that all stop, frisk, 
search, and arrest rates are higher in neighborhoods with high parolee 
density. 
Our results do not prove that it is the parolees who are actually being 
searched or arrested at higher rates It is likely, given the low numbers of 
parolees even in high parolee density neighborhoods, that even if police 
target high parolee neighborhoods, they will mostly stop nonparolees. 
However, it is far harder to explain our results in the Frisk, Search, and 
Arrest Data if the police are not targeting parolees. Even if police are 
targeting high parolee neighborhoods but most or even all parolees 
managed to slip through the net, their neighbors still pay the price for the 
lower rights that the courts have deemed parolees to have. As such, our 
results support the possibility that the Fourth Amendment rights of 
nonparolees living in communities are being eroded by the various rules 
that lower the rights of parolees. In fact, it is hard not to reach the 
conclusion that nonparolee members of parolee-dense communities are 
suffering because, as mentioned, our numbers are substantively significant 
even though we are examining the effect of any person in the community 
being stopped, arrested, and searched,328 not just parolees. Thus, these 
statistics imply that nonparolees (who make up the vast majority of these 
communities) are being negatively affected. 
 
 328. The negative result on the frisk coefficient means that we cannot draw a similar conclusion 
for frisks. 
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To summarize the key conclusions we can draw from the results of 
our two databases: 
1. Police target high parolee neighborhoods for increased stops. 
2. Police are not simply targeting convicts, since frisks are 
negatively associated with parolees per capita whereas 
searches and arrests are positively associated. 
3. Police are taking advantage of permissive parolee search rules 
that allow them to search parolees with effectively lowered 
standards of suspicion, since frisks are significantly lower yet 
searches are significantly higher in high parolee 
neighborhoods. 
4. Arrests are positively associated with high parolee 
neighborhoods, suggesting that permissive parolee search 
rules may well be contributing to recidivism rates. 
5. Nonparolees as well as parolees are likely being subjected to 
increased stops, searches, and arrests, and so these rules are 
having an adverse effect on the broader communities in which 
parolees live. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has cast serious doubt on the wisdom of the current parole 
system in the United States. At every stage of their interactions with the 
state, parolees’ rights are being diminished. Samson allows suspicionless 
searches, and thus effectively makes arrests of parolees more likely. Even 
in states such as New York that do not necessarily take full advantage of 
Samson, police are nevertheless given greater deference in factors that 
point towards suspicion when conducting Terry stops and frisks. Even 
without Samson, the courts’ doctrine creates enormous leverage over 
parolees for police and others alike, since the potential repercussions of 
even ill-founded parole violations can result in three months of 
imprisonment. All these effects undermine parolees’ residential options, 
job opportunities, and stabilizing relationships, which are the fundamental 
predictors of recidivism probabilities. At the same time, parole can even 
extend rather than reduce incarceration of parolees, even beyond maximum 
statutory terms. The goal behind these rules is strengthened law 
enforcement in order to reduce recidivism rates. However, all of these 
elements have rendered the parole system so punitive that not only does it 
undermine the rehabilitative aims of the system, but also it increases 
parolees’ likelihood to reoffend by making them vulnerable to influence 
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and threats from law enforcement and criminal elements.  
It is not only parolees who are bearing the cost of this jurisprudential 
miscalculation. Our empirical results show that whole communities are 
being adversely affected by these policies. Nonparolees who live in 
parolee-dense neighborhoods are being stopped, searched, and arrested at 
significantly higher rates, an effect not explained simply by high-crime 
neighborhoods or by racial profiling. Punitive conditions that the Supreme 
Court has approved for parolees cast a long shadow over nonparolees. 
The modern parole jurisprudence needs to be reconsidered. However, 
the whole solution does not lie with the courts. Institutions at every stage of 
the parole process contribute to the attrition of rights that we describe. 
Public defenders could better advise arrestees of the implications of 
accepting plea bargains that involve parole. But many public defenders are 
not as aware of the adverse effects of parole as they should be. This is a 
product not only of the well-documented underfunding of those public 
defenders, but also of the institutional structure of those institutions.329 For 
instance, parole violation units are sometimes separated from other 
divisions within public defender offices. Consequently, public defenders 
negotiating plea deals do not have meaningful interactions with those 
representing parolee recidivists, and so they can easily be unaware of the 
repercussions for their clients when they return to court on parole 
violations.  
Similarly, parole offices are organized in such a way as to incentivize 
reporting violations of release conditions. Each parolee in custody is one 
less case in parole officers’ typically overburdened caseloads, so those 
officers have an incentive to not only police minor offenses, but potentially 
even to create them. For instance, parole officers have the discretion to set 
mandatory meetings in the middle of the workday and then report parolees 
for violations for nonattendance. Any solutions to the harms of parole that 
are detailed in this Article have to involve rethinking all of the institutions 
that contribute to the problem. 
 
 329. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 50–60 (2009), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/ 
pdf/139.pdf. 
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APPENDIX: New York Stop, Question and Frisk Report Worksheet 
 
